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Where a depot company contracts to furnish terminal facilities for the passenger
business of a railroad, it is bound to use ordinary care and diligence to keep its
premises in a safe condition for passengers ; and this obligation renders it liable for
knowingly employing, or allowing to be employed in the depot building, a man
of vicious temper, of bad character, and who frequently assaults passengers in a
wilful and vicious manner.
Appeal from District Court of Ramsay .County.
Davis, Kellogg and Severance, for appellant.
John O'Brien, I V D. Heard, and Cole, Bramh all and
Morris, for respondent.
COLLINS, J., August 5, 1889. The plaintiff appeals from an
order sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, on the
ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. From said complaint, and a stipulation as to certain
facts, made by the parties, and by agreement considered as if
the facts therein stated had been a part of the pleadings de-
murred to, it appears that the defendant is a domestic corpora-
tion, organized for and engaged in the business of furnishing
and conducting an Union Depot and station-house in the city
of St. Paul, in which several lines of railway deliver and receive
passengers, by virtue of their contracts with defendant; that
on May 17th, 1888, plaintiff reached said depot as a passenger
upon one of the said roads, and with the intention of pursuing
his journey to a point beyond, by another road, entered the
station-house, approached the parcel-room therein, leased by
defendant to a tenant who operated and controlled it, for the
purpose of checking his valise and was there maliciously at-
tacked and beaten by the man in charge, who was in fact the
employe of defendant's tenant. The complaint further alleges
that this employe was of vicious temper, of bad character, and
had frequently, in a wilful and malicious manner, assaulted and
beaten people lawfully upon the premises, during the six years
he had been employed in said parcel-room, all of which was
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known to the defendant on the day of the attack upon plaintiff.
In support of its demurrer, the defendant corporation con-
tends, first, that it owed no duty whatever to the plaintiff, be-
cause no contractual relation existed between the parties; that
therefore he must look to the railway company, whose passen-
ger he was or had been, for compensation for his injuries;
second, if it should be held that the duties imposed by railway
companies towards their arriving and departing passengers
have been assumed by the defendant, it is not responsible in
this case, because the alleged assault was not committed by
one of its servants or employes, but by the employe of a
tenant who was engaged in an independent business, wholly
disconnected from that of a common carrier of passengers, and
conducted solely for the accommodation and convenience of
those who choose to patronize the room and pay for the privi-
lege of having their parcels temporarily taken care of. Finally,
if these positions prove untenable, it is argued that the assault
of the employe was for purposes of his own, outside of his
occupation, in disregard of the object for which he was em-
ployed, not committed in execution of it, and therefore, in no
event, can the defendant be held responsible. It has been an-
nounced by this Court, in Aklbeck v. St. P. H. & .f. Ry. Co. [de-
cided in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, November 20, 1888]
that in respect to the handling and care of baggage, the rela-
tion between the defendant corporation and the carriers who
use its depot, is that of principal and agent. But under the
allegations of the complaint now before us, it is not essential
to determine the precise relations existing between the defend-
ant (organized for the special purpose and under contract to
furnish to certain railway corporations proper and adequate
depot and station-house accommodations for those who are
entitled to use the same) and the plaintiff, who, arriving upon
the train of one of these carriers, remained its passenger until
he had an opportunity, by safe and convenient means, to leave
the cars, the railway and the station-house: Warrez v. Fich-
huig Ry. Co. (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 227.
Nor is it necessary to pass upon the contention of the defend-
ant, that whatever duty it owed the plaintiff as a passenger, it
cannot be held liable for the wilful act of the servant and em-
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ploye of one who had leased a room in its depot building for
the purpose of carrying on an independent business, not
required of the carriers of passengers and conducted by a
tenant, solely for the convenience of the traveling public.
Nor, as we regard the pleadings, need we regard the final posi-
tion assumed by defendant, that the master is not responsible
for the wilful acts of his servant, performed outside of his em-
ployment, not in execution of it, and for purposes of his own,
although the subject has been referred to in McCord v. West-
en U. T Co. [decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
September 4, 1888], in which is mentioned approvingly,
the case of Stewart v. Ry. Co. (1882), 90 N. Y. 588, whereby
Isaacs v. Third Avenue Co. (1871), 47 N. Y. I22-relied upon
by the respondent-was, in effect, overruled.
This complaint, considered in connection with the stipula-
tion, charges that the defendant knowingly and advisedly per-
mitted its tenant to keep in his employ, for more than six
years, in its depot building, into which it encouraged people
to come, and was under contract to admit the plaintiff as an
arriving passenger, a man of savage and vicious propensities
and who had, during said period of six years, frequently
assaulted and beaten persons lawfully upon said premises, and
who, upon the day named, attacked and beat the plaintiff with-
out provocation. Whatever obligation otherwise, by virtue of
its contract with the carrier, rested upon the defendant as to
the plaintiff, it is manifest that it was bound to use ordinary
care and diligence to keep its premises in a safe condition for
those who legitimately came there. It had no more right,
therefore, to knowingly and advisedly employ, or allow to be
employed, in its depot building, a dangerous and vicious man,
than it would have to keep and harbor a dangerous and savage
dog, or other animal, or to permit a pitfall, or trap, into which
a passenger might step, as he was passing to or from his train.
Order reversed.
The doctrine announced in this case It is contended by the writer that the
is wholesome and salutary, and it is re- principle for this doctrine is, that the
gretted that the principle upon which proprietor, owner or controller of a place
it should rest, was not carefully consid- open to and for the public, is bound, as
ered and as emphatically announced, a matter of duty, to see that all persons
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who come there on the business for
which the place is open, are protected
from assaults and insults, because,having
the privilege of doing such a business
and inviting the public to come there,
he owes the duty to protect all who
come there on that business. This
principle was some years ago asserted
by the Indiana Court in Henry v. Den-
nis (1883), 93 Ind. 45z; and recently
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Romind v. Schasnbacher (1888), S20
Pa. 582; S.C., 27 A.ER. LAW REG. 156.
Thi3 is nothing more than the announce-
ment of the general doctrine of duty
to another invited to a place of business.
It is objected that, if this principle is
carried to its legitimate conclusion, it
will hold responsible proprietors of
stores, and business houses, for assaults
and insults committed by strangers who
come there with the vicious purpose
and intent to do wrong. Is there any
reason why they should not be held re-
sponsible? If the proprietor had knowl-
edge or notice of the vicious intent, or
propensity, or, with reasonable care,
could have had such notice, he should
be held responsible for his neglect of
duty, in not keeping such persons away.
If he did not have such notice, and
could not have had it by the exercise of
reasonable watchfulness and care, there
is then a reason for exemption from lia-
bility, but, as will hereafter appear, the
reason for the principle above stated
does not advance this distinction.
The Minnesota Court (Ak/beck v.
Railroad Co., supra, p. 23; AfeCord v.
Westernz Union Telegrapb Co., stepra,
p. 24), holds the defendant liable, be-
cause he did not keep his premises in
safe condition, free from dangerous and
vicious men, the same as he must keep
it free from dangerous and vicious dogs
or other animals, and free from pitfalls
or traps.
There are three different doctrines
announced in this supposed principle
given as the ground or reason for the
ruling in this case: the first is the prin-
ciple which governs the liability result-
ing from defective and dangerous prem-
ises; the-second is the principle which
controls liability for injuries from dan-
gerous and vicious dogs or other ani-
mals; and the third, those applicable
to human beings.
The principles which control the law
applicable to the actions of man, are
different from those regulating the
liability for defective premises, or dan-
gerous and other animals. The princi-
ples of the law of liability for defective
premises are confined to the unsafe
condition, arising from unsafe construc-
tion, repair or use, as for instance in-
juries from pit-falls, the law of which
has remained substantially the same
since the case of lyth v. Top ham
(1603), Cro. Jac. 158; Roll Abr. 88;
or injuries from spring guns and other
instruments of destruction, first discussed
in Deane v. Clayton (1817), 7 Taunt.
489 ; and developed in Ilolt v. Wilkes
(1820), 3 Barn. and Aid. 304; Bird v.
Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing. 628; Wootton
v. Dawkinr (1857), 2 C. B. (N. S.)
413; Townsend v. Wathen. (i8o8), 9
East 277; Hooker v. Miller (1873),
37 Iowa 613; Johnson v. Patterson,
(184o), 14 Conn. I : Or injuries from
dangerous places, or dangerous instru-
mentalities, on private premises or pri-
vate way, near the highway: liar-
greaves v. Deacon (1872), 25 Mich. I;
Kfohn v. orvett (1871), 44 Ga. 251;
Corby v. Hill (1858), 4 C. B. (N. S.)
554; Clark v. Chambers (1878), 3 Q.
B. Div. 327; or injuries from dangerous
places in business houses and grounds,
as defined in Carleton v. Franconia
Iron Co. (1868), 99 Mass. 216; and
Indeinaurv. Daine? (1866), L. R. i C.
P. 27 4 ; on Appeal (i867),2 C. P. 3 11 :
or dangerous places in public houses,
places of public resort, and exhibitions:
Francisv. Cockrell (187o), L. R. 5 Q.
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3. 184; or school buildings: Donovan
v. Board of Education (1878), 55
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 176; Bassett v.
Fish (1877), 12 Hun. (N. Y.) 209.
The application of this principle to
railroad depots, stations, platforms and
approaches, means that these must be
free from such defects, as far as reason-
able care can make them; and is well
expressed by GRAY, J., in Carleton v.
.Franconia r'on Co. (1868), 99 Mass.
216: "The owner, or occupant of
premises is liable in damages to those
coming to it, using due care, at his in-
vitation or inducement, express or im-
plied, on any business to be transacted
or permitted by him, for an injury oc-
ca-ioned by the unsafe condition of the
land, or of the access to it, which is
known to him and not to them, and
which he has negligently suffered to
exist and has given them no notice of."
So, AfcDonald v. Chicago, etc., .R. Co.
(1869), 26 Iowa 124; Toledo, etc., R.R.
Co. v. Grush (1873), 67 Ill. 262; Lis-
comb v. N. J.,'et., Trans. Co. (1872),
6 Lans. (N. Y.) 75; Picard v. Smith
(1861), IO C. B. (N. S.) 470; lartin
v. Great Northern R. Co. (1855), I6
C. B. 179 ; Clussman v. Long )sland,
etc., R.Co. (1877), 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 618.
The care demanded is reasonable care
only: Pittslurgh, etc., R. Co. v. Brigham
(1876), 29 Ohio St. 374; Indiana, etc.,
R. Co. v. Zrudleson (1859), 13 Ind. 325;
W r te v. London, etc., R. Co. (1869),
L. R. 4 Q. B. 693; Chicago, etc., R. Co.
v. IWilson (1872), 63 Il. r67; Corn-
inan v. Eastern Counties R. Co. (1859),
4 Hurl. & Nor. 781 ; Cross v. L. S. &
N S. R. R. Co. (1888), 27 AMER. LAW
REG. 405.
The liability for injuries by vicious
and dangerous dogs, or other animals,
rests on different principles; see a
lengthy annotation to Worthen v. Love,
27 AMER. LAW REG. 631. At com-
non law, the owner of a dog was not
iable for its vicious acts, unless he had
knowledge of the vicious propensities
and failed to exercise thz proper care
in restraint, because a dog was con-
sidered tame and harmless, and hence
to charge the owner or keeper, scienter
must be alleged and proved: Read v.
Edwards (x864), 17 C. B. (N. S.) 245;
Dearth v. Baker (1867), 22 Wis. 73;
Slingerv. Henneman(1875), 38 Id. 504;
Fairchild v. Bentley (858), 30 Barb.
(N.Y.) x47. This is the rule asto all ani-
mals domits naturae, unless changed
by State statute, but with respect to
wild animals, the owner, or keeper,
was held an insurer against all injuries,
though the late cases seem to place the
liability upon the degree of care used,
holding the keeper, or owner, to that
high degree of care which a knowledge
of the vicious propensities seems to de-
mand: Cooley on Torts 349. In both
cases, the scienter must be alleged and
proved, because, knowing the vicious
and dangerous propensities, it is his
duty to adopt such measures, and use
such precaution and restraint as will
prevent injury from such propensities:
Alayv. Burdett (1846), 9 Q. B. io;
Earl v. Van Astine (1850), 8 Barb.
(N. Y.) 630; Van Leuven v. Lyke
(1848), I N. Y. 515; Loomis v. Terry
(1837), 07 Wend. (N. Y.) 496.
A careful and exhaustive research
has failed to discover any authority,
where this doctrine has been applied to
human beings, because the purposes,
causes, and reasons, fortthe birth and
existence of the doctrine are not appli-
cable to man, and it is believed that no
court, and no writer, has heretofore as-
serted such an application. Among
the many reasons for the non-applica-
bility of this doctrine to the acts of man,
discoverable by a study of the cases, is
the primitive one, that with all law and
at all times, man has been recognized as
a rational being, not possessing and in-
capable of exercising the propensities
of the dog, or other animal, but pos-
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sessed of the faculties of a rational and
responsible actor and punishable as
such, for any criminal transgression;
that being the only way, known to all
law, to regulate the action of man, ex-
cept when devoid of this rational ele-
ment, in which case he would be placed
custodia legis.
Upon the ground of public policy,
and as an essential in the regulation
and protection of diversified rights in
communities, this elementary law (that
the only remedy for a crime, is the pun-
ishment, civilly and criminally, of the
person who commits it) has been modi-
fied, or changed, with respect to inn-
keepers, carriers of passengers, assaults,
etc., committed by servants, while act-
ing within the line of their duty, and
now by the Pennsylvania (Rommelv.
Schambacher(I887), 126 Pa. 582; s.c.,
27 AMER. LAW REG. 156) and Minne-
sota courts (in Ahlbeck v. St. Paul, P.
AZf &A . Co., and AfeCord v. Wcsent
Union Tel. Co., sitpra, pp. 23, 24), to
places open to and for the entertain-
ment of the public. In these cases, the
principal is held responsible for the as-
saults, or insults, which lie did not com-
mit. He is punished civiliter, for a crime
which another committed, because pub-
lic policy exacts the duty of protection
in such cases, and holds him, who is
required to exercise that duty, liable for
any fai!ure or neglect.
Within the law governing the liability
of innkeepers, may be found the whole
and true principle for holding one man
civilly responsible for a crime commit-
ted by another, and the application of
this doctrine to the other classes, is not
the advancement of a new principle in
the law. There is no difference be-
tween the reasons which bold the inn-
keeper responsible, and those for hold-
ing a master liable for the assaults of
his servant, while doing the business
with which he was entrusted, and
holding a railroid liable for assaults by
its employees. It is settled that a car-
rier is liable for an assault upon a pas-
senger, whether committed by an em-
ploye or a stranger. Some jurisdic-
tions place the liability on the ground
of contract, and others on the ground of
duty, while the minority of the cases ex-
clude all liability for assault, unless
committed by the servant within the
scope of his duty, but do "not define
what is or what is not within the line of
the servant's duty. Prominent in fol-
lowing this judicial jugglery is the
Supreme Court of Ohio in ( Witinore v.
L. Jl1. R. .R. Co. (x869), i9 Ohio St.
Iio) holding the carrier not liable where
the baggage checker struck the passen-
ger with a hatchet whilst in the act of
checking his baggage, on the ground
that the servant was hired to check
baggage and not to use the hatchet or
assault passengers, hence he was acting
outside the scope of his duty. Whether
the principle for the liability is that of
contract or duty, the weight of the
decisions hold the carrier bound to pro-
tect the passenger during the ingress to
the carriage, and the exit. The princi-
ple for the protection during the carri-
age in the conveyance of the carrier, is
plain, no matter whether it rests on
contract or duty, because it is only a
distinction of terms, and not of sub-
stance, to say, that as matter of law,
the passenger contracted for safe trans-
portation (as most clearly announced in
Chamberlain v. Chandler (1823), U. S.
C. Ct. Dist. Mass., 3 Mason 242), or
that the law imposes the duty of safe
transportation.
For an assn-ult committed on a pas-
senger during the time he is being car-
ried in the conveyance, the weight of
the authority is that the liability rests
on contract; namely, that the pas-
senger contracted for safe transporta-
tion, and an assault is a breach of that
contract; or, in other wor.ls, the law
i,npo;es the duty of safe transp rtation
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by virtue of the contract, whether the
breach is committed by a stranger, or
by a servant, without respect to the
question whether the servant was or
was not acting within the scope of his
duty: Chamberlain v. Chandler, sup ra,
p. 27; Nieto v. Clark (1858), U. S. C.
Ct., Dist. Mass., I Cliff. 145; Goddard
v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1869), 57 Me.
202; Craker v. Chicago, ec.,Ry. (1875),
36 Wis. 657; Chicago, ec., R. R. v.
.Flexnan (1882), 103 Ill 546; Fa k t
Co. v. True (1878), 88 Id. 608; Sher-
ley v. Billings (1871), 8 Bush. (Ky.)
147; McKinley v. R. R. (1876), 44
Iowa 314; New Orleans R. R. v.
Burke(I876), 53 Miss. 200; Bryant
v. Rich (187O), zo6 Mass. 18o; land-
reau v. Bell (1833), 5 La. (0. S.) 434;
Flintv. Trans. Co. (1868), 34 Conn.
554; Pitlsburgh, etc., R. R.v. Hinds
(r866), 53 Pa. 512; Phila. &- Reading
R. R. v. Derby (1852), 14 How. (55 U.
S.) 468; Seymour v. Greenwood (1861),
7 Hurl., Nor. 354; Mloore v. Fitch-
burg, etc., R. R. (1855),4 Gray (Mass.)
465; Weed v. Panama R. Co. (1858),
17 N. Y. 362; Mlilwaukee, etc., R. v.
Finney (i86o), IO Vis. 388; Quigley
v. Cenral Pac. R. Co. (1876) ii Nev.
350; Malecek v. Tower Grove R. R.
Co. (1874), 57 Mo. 18; Hanson v.
European, etc., R. R. Co. (1873) 62
Me. 84; Pendleton v. Ainsley (1871),
U. S. C. Ct., Dist. R. I., 3 Cliff. 416;
Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. Co.(I876),
64 N. Y. 129; Shea v. Sixth 4ve. R.
Co. (1875), 62 Id. i8o; Cohen v. Dry
Dock Co. (1877), 69 Id. 170; Stewart
v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. (1882), 90 Id.
588; Ramnsden v. Boston & 41b. R. R.
(1870), 104 Mass. 117; Teire Haute
and Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Jackson
(1882), 81 Ind. i9; Wabash and .
Louis R. R. v. Rector (1882), 104 Ill.
296; Lynch v. Mret. Elevated R. R.
(1882), 90 N. Y. 77; Louisville, etc.,
R. R. v. Kelly (1883), 92 Ind. 371;
International, etc., R. R. v. Kenle
(Y883), 2 Tex. Ct. App. 262; Bryat
v. Chicago, etc., R. R. (884) 63 Iowa
464. This liability is confined to the
period during which the passenger was
loeing carried in the carrier's convey-
ance; as where, during the carriage,
the brakeman struck the plaintiff be-
cause he intimated that the brakeman
stole his watch: Chicago, etc., R. R.
v. Flexonan (1882), 103 II. 546;
where the clerk assaulted the passen-
ger: Sherley v. Rellings (1871), &
Bush. (Ky.) 147 ; where the conductor
kissed a lady passenger: Craker v.
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (1875), 36 'Vis.
657; where the driver of the street car
assaulted and beat the plaintiff: Ste.-vart
v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. (1882), 90 N.
Y. 588.
The other line of decisions ex-
clude the theory of contract or cuty
arising out of contract, and place the
liability on the ground of the serv-
ant acting within the scope of his em-
ployment; the rule being, if the servant
committed the assault, or tortious act,
within the line of his employment, the
master was held liable, and if he did
not so commit it, the master was not
liable. The difficulty was in determin-
ing what was, and what was not, within
the servant's line of duty, and this has
been the trouble since the case of Mac-
manus v. Cricket (18oo), I East 103,
which introduced the rule. The juris-
dictions which hold the carrier liable,
on the ground of contract, or duty, must
necessarily reject this ru!e, and it is not
applicable to innkeepers, nor, in Penn-
sylvania (Rommnel v. Schamnbach, r
(1887), 126 Pa., 582; S. C. 27 At R.
LAW REG. 156) to saloons or places
open to the public, and, by the deci-
sion in the principal case, not applicable
to depot companies. Where the doctrine
prevails, the decisions attempted to de-
fine the rule, some stating the test to be
the answer to the question "Was the
servant acting for his own purpose, or
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the purposes, or behalf of the com-
pany? "-and others that "If the serv-
ant has the power to do the act, the
master is responsible for the manner in
-which it was done,"-as, for instance,
having the power to eject a passenger
from the car, the carrier was held re-
sponsible, if the ejection was improper
andunlawful: Indanapolis, etc. R.R. v.
Anthony (1873), 43 Ind. 183; as ejec-
tion on a false charge, on improper
grounds and abuse of the power:
Ramsden v. Boston & Ab. R. R.
(I870), 104 Mass. 117; Higgins v.
Watervliet, etc., R. R. (1871), 46 N. Y.
23; Passenger .R. R. v. Young.(18 7),
21 Ohio St. 5 I8; Beddinov. South Caro-
lina R. R. (1871), 3 S. C. I; Schultze
v. ThirdAve. (I88o), 46 N.Y. Super. Ct.
211. On the other hand, the carrier was
held not liable for the assault upon a
passenger, by a brakeman: Evansville
R. R2. v. Raz,, (x866), 26 Ind. 70; nor
for the driver of the car knocking a
small boy from the platform: Piltsburg,
etc., R. .R. v. Donahue (1871), 70 Pa.
119; because in the former case the
brakeman was not pursuing his duties
;s a brakeman when he committed the
assault, that is, he did not assault the
passenger while in the act of turning or.
regulating the brakes; and in the latter
,case, because the driver's line of duty
was to drive and not to put any one off
the car.
In the jurisdictions which hold the
carrier liable on the ground of contract,
,or duty, arising from contract, the iden-
tical facts in Evansville R. R. v. Baut
(1866), 26 Ind. 7o, and Piltsburg, etc.,
2. R. v. Donahue (1871), 70 Pa. 119,
-were sufficient to hold the carrier liable:
Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Flexman (1882),
103 11L 546. The reason of the conflict
is that two different principles have been
invoked, one following the doctrine of
duty, and the other respaondeatsuperior;
.one, that it is a duty, which the law im-
poses and'the principal cannot shirk, and
is therefore liable, whether he performs
the duty personally, or delegates it to
another; and the other depends upon
the fact, whether the servant acted within
the scope of his employment.
If it could be generally affirmed that
a master is liable for the acts of his ser-
vant, tortious or contractural, while doing
the business with which he is entrusted
there would not occur so much trouble.
The servant, quoad the business, is the
master during the transaction of that
business, as, for instance, the brakeman
of the train represents the master dur-
ing the whole trip, and whether he acts
as brakeman, conductor, porter or car
sweeper, the passenger and third per-
sons have the right to hold the principal,
present and acting in the person of the
brakeman, and doing in all respects that
which the principal would do if present.
It is very narrow judgment to split such
business up into as many divisions as the
servant wishes, making one port the acts
of the master, and the other part only
binding on the servant; as, forinstance,
where the conductor stopped the train
and took up the plaintiff's child: Gill-
iam v. South, etc., R. R. (I88I), 70
Ala. 268; or set fire to the child:
Cooley 68; it was held that the master
was not liable. It was the servant's act,
outside of the line of his duty to his
master.
The distinction is too small. The
master put into the hands of the servant
the means by which the wrong was
committed. He hired the wrong ser-
vant. If the master had been in charge
of the train, or if he had hired a care-
ful and proper servant, the train would
not have stopped and the assault would
not have been committed, nor the child
fired. Hence, because he failed in his
duty, by hiring the wrong servant, the
master is exempt from liability for the
wrongs his servant commits.
The objection is not directed to the
substance of the doctrine, but to the
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statement of it. If properly defined and
properly applied, it is believed to be in
perfect accord with the doctrine of
duty. Take the case which first laid
down the rule: lfacnanus v. Cricket
(i8oo), I East io3, and ask the ques-
tion, which is the more sensible, to'
say that having put the servant in charge
of a vehicle to drive to a certain place,
the master is liable for all the acts of
the servant while so driving the vehicle,
because be is put there by the master
to perform a duty which the master was
bound to do; namely, to drive - the
vehicle and conduct himself so as not
to do injury to another; or to say that
the master is not liable, because the
servant, instead of going on the direct
road to do the business with which he
was entrusted, went in a roundabout
way and committed the wrong com-
plained of. In the former case, the
master is liable, because it was his dity
to so use'his property as notto injure an-
other, whether he drove the vehicle
himself, or entrusted the driving to his
servant; and in the latter case, the
question of route is the criterion.
Holding a master responsible for the
willful wrong of the servant, is an in-
fringement of the natural and primitive
rule that man, being rational, is indi-
vidually responsible for his own wrongs,
and that one man should not suffer for
the wrongs and sins of another. The
term wrong, means willful, such as as-
saults and not negligence, or injuries
resulting from want of care. This im-
pingement was made for public policy,
in the law of innkeepers, and applied
Io the doctrine of respondeat superior,
and the other branches above mentioned,
but, because the principle for the im-
pingement is nowhere advanced, and
nowhere affirmed, the decisions have
oscillated to and fro. That the princi-
ple above contended for, is the true and
proper one, is supported by the reason-
ing and discussions of the following
cases : Phila. & Reading R. R. v.
Derby (I852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 468;
Phdadelphia, etc., R. R. v. Quigfley
(1858), 2x How. (62 U. S.) 202; 7oore
v. Fitchburg, etc., R. R. (1855),4 Gray.
Mass. 465 ; Pennsylvania, etc., R. .R. v.
VanDcver(1862),42Pa.365; Pittsburg,
etc., R. R. v. Shsser (1869), 29 Ohio,
St. 157; Atlantic, etc., R. R. v. .Dunn
(1869), Id. 162; Dalton v. Beers (187),
38 Conn. 529; Hokins v. Atlantic, dc.,
R. R. (1857), 36 N. H. 9; Baltimore,
etc., R. R. v. Blocher (1867), 27 Md.
277; Hansonv. EnropeanR. R.(i873 ),
62 Me. 84; Nw Orleans, etc., R. R. v.
B-urst (1859), 36 Miss. 66o; Sherlcyv.
Billings (1871), 8 Bush. (Ky.) 147;
17'ralecek v. Tower Grove 1?.R. (1874),
27 Mo. i8; Goddard v. Grand Trunk
Ry. (1869), 57 Me. 202, Brand v.
Schenectady, etc., R. R. (1850), 8 Barb.,
N. Y., 368; Seymour v. Greenwood
(1861), 7 Hurl. &Nor. 354; M7filwaukee
R. R. v. Finney (186o), 10 'Wis. 388;
Pittsburg, etc., R. R. v. Hinds (I46,),
53 Pa. 512; Weed v. Panana R. R.
(1858), 17 N. Y. 362; Flint v. Trans-
jportation Co. (1868), 34 Conn. 362;
Landreau v.Bell (1833), 5 La. (0. S.)
434; Chamberlain v. Chandler (1823),
U.S. C. Ct., Dist. Mass., 3 Mason 242;
iVieto v. Clark (1858), U. S. C. Ct., Dist.
Mass., I Cliff. 145. -
About the best discussion is found
in Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry.
(I869), 57 Me. 202; and the con-
clusion reached was that it was the
duty of the carrier to protect the
passenger against violence and in-
sults of strangers, co-passengers and
servants, and--" If this duty ii not per-
formed and this protection not furnished,
but on the contrary, the passenger is,
assaulted and insulted * * by the
carrier's servant, the carrier is responsi-
ble." The same conclusi6n is reached
in Rounds v. Delaware, etc., R. R.
(1876), 64 N. Y. 137, thQugh the rea-
soning is laborious and not close; the
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Court stated that the master who puts
the servant in a place to do the master's
business, is responsible for what the
servant does through lack of judgment,
or discretion, or from infirmity of
temper, or under the influence of pas-
sion, beyond the strict line of his duty
or authority and inflicts an unjustifiable
injury upon another. This reasoning
was followed in Cohen v. Dry Dock
Co. (1877), 6o N. Y. 17o . The same
line of argument was advanced in
Craker v. Chicago R. R. (1875), 36
Wis. 657; and in the cases there cited,
where the Court said that it would be
cheap and superficial morality to allow
one owing a duty to another, to com-
mit the performance of this duty to a
third person, and be exempt from re-
sponsibility for the malicious conduct
of the substitute.
The reasoning in Craker v. Chicago
etc., R.R. (1875), 36 Wis. 657; is well
enforcedby the casecited in the opinion.
The same reasoning and doctrine were
advanced in Stewart v. Brooklyn, elc.,
R. R. (1882), 90 N. Y. 588; which re-
pudiates some earlier cases, among
them Isaac v. The Third Avenue R. R.
('1871), 47 N. Y. 122, and which fol-
lows Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. R.
(1869), 57 Me. 202, and Craker v.
Chicago, etc., R. R. (1875), 36 Wis..
657; and the line cf cases advanced
to support the doctrine stated hy the
writer. The argument advanced in
Isaacs v. The Third Avenue R. R.
(1871), 47 N. Y. 122, is the same as
that found in Parker v. Erie, etc., ?.
R. (1875), 5 Hun. (N. Y.) 57; Little
AT. R. R. v. Wetmore (1869), 19 Ohio
St. hio; Ward v.Omnibus Co. (1873),
42 L. J. C. P. 265; Evansville v.
Baum (1866), 26 Ind. 70; Great
Western R. R. v. lMiller (1869), 19
Mich. 305; Priest v. Hudson River R.
R. (1871), 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 456;
Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. (1882),
58 Iowa 348; and has not that weight
of reason and logic in support which
are contained in the other cases.
JNo. F.'KELLY.
St. Paul, Minn.
Supreme Court of Texas.
INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA
V.
EASTON ET AL.
A warranty in a tolicy of fire insurance, that "this insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier," does not contravene public policy, nor is it in restraint
of trade.
Although a stipulation in a bill of lading, which gives the carrier the benefit of
any insurance upon the goods carried, is valid, and, in case of loss, will defeat the
insurer's right of subrogation, the insured, by entering into such a contract, forfeits
all rights under a policy containing a warranty that the insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier, nor can a carrier acquire any rights under such a policy.
It is immaterial, in such case, that the contract of insurance was made witholt
the carrier's knowledge or privity.
Appeal from District Court, Galveston County.
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Action by Nelson S. Easton and' others, Receivers of the
Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, against the In-
surance Company of North America. Judgment for plaintiffs,
and defendant appeals.
Hume & .Kleberg, for appellant.
Willie, Maott & Ballinger, for appellees.
STAYTON, C. J., March I, 1889. This case comes before us
on an agreed statement, made from the record, and signed by
counsel, which is as follows:
On the 22d day of June, 1885, appellant, a corporation having
its domicile in the State of Pennsylvania, issued an open policy
to Callender & Magnus, cotton buyers, residing in New York
City. This policy was renewed September I, 1886, for one
year, subject to certain conditions and the following express
warranty: "Warranted that this insurance shall not inure to
the benefit of any carrier." Under the terms of the open policy
all cotton purchased by Callender & Magnus, or by their agents
for them, in the United States, was at once covered by the
same as soon as purchased, they reporting as soon as practi-
cable to the insurance company the particulars of the purchase,
as to marks, value, amount of insurance desired, etc. The
insurance company would then issue to Callender & Magnus
a certificate of insurance, giving date from which insurance
began, number of bales insured, amount of insurance, locality
of cotton, and its intended route of shipment. But the insur-
ance as such was complete under the said open policy as soon
as the cotton was purchased, even before the certificate was
issued; the certificate being only a statement giving the details
of the particular transaction, such as value, amount insured,
and route of shipment, but without in any manner altering or
modifying the terms and conditions of the open policy, or the
conditions and Warranty contained in the aforesaid renewal
thereof. The purpose of an open policy is convenience to the
assurad, and to insure his property from the very moment of
its acquisition. This could not be done if he was required to
make a separate contract for each lot of cotton which he may
purchase in different parts of the country. The danger and
risk which would necessarily intervene after the purchase is
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made until insurance could be effected by special policy, would
have to be borne by the owner. Upon the open policy, how-
ever, the owner is protected by the insurance upon all pur-
chases, no matter where and when made, and though loss
should occur before report of the purchase to the insurer, or
issuance of the certificate of insurance. Premiums under the
policy in this case were payable monthly upon amounts insured
thereunder for that period.
On the 9 th day of December, 1886, Callender & Magnus, by
one of their agents, bought and became the owners of fifty bales
of cotton at Mexia, Tex. The advice of this purchase reached
the office of the appellant insurance company some time there-
after, and said company, on the I6th of said month, issued to
Callender & Magnus a certificate of insurance. The certificate
provides that it represented and took the place of the policy,
and conveyed all the rights of the original policy-holder (for
the purpose of collecting any loss or claim) as fully as if the
property was covered by a special policy direct to the holder
of the certificate, and the certificate was dated New York, De-
cember 16, 1886.
On the IIth day of December, 1886, Callender & Magnus,
by their agents, delivered to appellees, who are common car-
riers, at the town of Mexia, Tex., to be shipped to Liverpool,
England, the said fifty bales of cotton, and on the same day
appellees delivered to the said agents of Callender & Magnus
a bill of lading containing, among other things, the following
provision-
"In case ot any loss, detriment, or damage done to, or sustained by, any of the
property herein receipted for during such transportation, whereby any legal liability
shall or may be incurred, that company alone shall be answerable therefor in whose
actual custody the same be at the time of the happening of such loss, detriment, or
damage, and the carrier so liable shall have full benefit of any insurance that may
have been effected upon or on account of said cotton."
On the 12th day of December, 1886, while said cotton was
in the custody of appellees, in their capacity as common car-
riers, forty bales thereof, of the value of $ 1,725.34, were totally
destroyed by fire. The appellant was notified of the destruc-
tion of the cotton December 21, 1886. When the appellant
issued the certificate of insurance to Callender & Magnus it
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had no notice or knowledge of that clause in the bill of lading
which provides that the carrier of said cotton shall have the
benefit of any insurance which may have been effected upon or
on account of said cotton. The fact that such clause was con-
tained in said bill of lading was first brought to the knowledge
of appellant when the bill of lading was presented to it, as one
of the proofs of loss required, some time after the 21st of De-
cember, I886. Appellees had no actual notice of the warranty
in the policy stipulating that the. insurance should not inure to-
the benefit of any carrier, and, being liable for the loss of the
cotton as common carriers, paid the same, whereupon Callen-
der & Magnus transferred to them the certificate of insurance-
Appellant declined to pay the policy to Callender & Magnus
because the same had been forfeited by their acceptance of the
bill of lading. Appellant declining to pay for the loss, appel-
lees, on the 27th of September, 1887, sued it in the District
Court of Galveston county. That Court held the clause in the
policy, providing that the instrument shall not inure to the
benefit of any carrier, to be void, because in restraint of trade
and against public policy, and rendered judgment for appellees
for I,725.34. From this judgment the Insurance Company
of North America appeals, and the following questions of law,
embraced in the assignments of error, are now by agreement
respectfully submitted to this Court for its decision: (I) Is the
warranty in the policy, which provides that the insurance shall
not inure to the benefit of any carrier, a valid and lawful stipu-
lation in the contract of insurance, and does a violation thereof
forfeit the policy, or is said warrantk in restraint of trade and
contrary to public policy? (2) Under the particular facts of
this case, irrespective of any rights which Callender & Magnus
may have had under the contract of insurance, can appellees
under the law recover against the appellant?
It must now be held that so much of the clause in the bill
of lading as provided that "the carrier so liable shall have full
benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or
on account of said cotton," is not invalid by reason of its con-
travening any rule based on public policy: Insurance Co. v.
Railway Co. (I885), 63 Tex. 475; Insurance Co. v. Transpor-
tation Co. (I886), 117 U. S. 312; 4zrnan v. Railway Co. (1889),
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129 U. S. 128; Rintoul v. Railroad Co. (1883), U. S. Circ. Ct.,
S. Dist. N. Y., 17 Fed. Repr. 905 ; Platt v. Railroad Co. (I888),
io8 N. Y. 358; Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co. (1885), 139 Mass.
508. In the case first referred to, the bill of lading was prior,
in point of time, to the policy, which recited the fact of ship-
ment, and it was held that this was sufficient evidence that the
policy was issued, with notice of the right secured by the car-
rier by contract, and in subordination to that right. The same
ruling was made in the second case cited, in which it is as-
sumed that the contracts of carriage and insurance were made
simultaneously, the insurer being ignorant of the clause in the
bill of lading which subrogated the carrier to the rights of ship-
per under the policy. In disposing of the case the Court said-
"The policy containing no express stipulation upon the subject, and there being
no evidence of any fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation by the owner in
obtaining the insurance, the existence of the stipulation between the owner and
the carrier would have afforded no defense to an action on the policy, according to
the careful judgments rendered in June last, and independently of each other,-
the one by the English Court of Appeal, and the other by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts: Tale v. HZ)'slo (1885), L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 368; Jack-
son Co. v. Insurance Co. (I885), 139 Mlass. 508."
In Iunan v. Railway Co., supra, it appeared that the policy
issued some time before the shipment was made, and, while
recognizing the validity of a contract between the shipper and
carrier, whereby the latter should become entitled to the bene-
fit of insurance made by the former in a proper case, the
Court said-
"The policies here were all taken out some weeks before the shipments were
made, although, of course, they did not attach until then, and recovery upon
neither of them could have been had, except upon condition of resort over against
the carrier, any act of the owners to defeat which operated to cancel the liability
of the insurers. They could nottherefore, be made available for the benefit of
the carrier."
In Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co., supra, it was assumed that
the carrier might contract for the benefit of insurance secured
by the shipper, and the inference to be drawn from the report
of the case is, that the policy, made the basis of the action,
was issued after the right of the carrier to the benefit of in-
surance had attached. The shipper bought through a broker,
who it seems did not read the receipts securing to the carrier
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the benefit of insurance. The railroad's receipt, with draft at-
tached, was forwarded by the broker to the shipper, the draft
cashed, notice given to the insurance company of the ship-
ments, and the policy presented, that the shipment might be
evidenced thereon, which was done. This seems to have been
the act which applied the insurance to the cotton destroyed
while in transit, and no inquiry was made as to the terms of
shipment when insurance was thus obtained. In disposing of
the case the Court said-
" That the contract between the plaintiff and the carrier was binding and valid
being conceded, we are brought to the conclusion expressed in the ruling of the
Judge who presided at the trial, ' that in a case where there was no intention to
deprive the insurance company of its rights, and no intentional fraud and conceal-
ment, and where the plaintiff (shipper) was actually ignorant of the stipulation re-
lied on at the time it made the insurance or obtained the indorsement on the policy,
and was ignorant, when it ordered the cotton, that any such stipulation would be
made, and there was no actual misrepresentation, an insurance company insuring
property in transilu, making no provision in regard to the nature of the contract
of carriage, and not requesting to see the bill of lading or receipt, and making no
inquiries about them, must be held to have insured it under and subject to the ac-
tual contract of carriage, so far as it was a lawful contract.'"
Under this state of facts it was held that the carrier, by
virtue of its contract, became subrogated to all rights held by
the shipper against the insurer; and that thus was defeated
the right of the insurer to be subrogated, on payment of the
loss, to the right against the carrier, to which, but for the con-
tract of shipment, the insurer, under the settled principles of
law, would have been entitled. This case, while holding that
the right of the insured, when dependent only on his relation
to the carrier, to modify by contract the rule of subrogation,
cannot be questioned, concedes that no contract made between
the insured and the insurer, whereby the right to modify the
general rule of subrogation is withdrawn from the insured,
can be controlled by a contract between the insured and the
the carrier.
In Insurance Co. v. Calebs (1859), 20 N. Y. 175, it was held
that a contract between a carrier and shipper, substantially
such as is set up in this case, was valid; and on payment of a
loss under a policy issued after the contract for carriage was
made, the right of subrogation was denied to the insurer. In
disposing of the case the Court said-
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"It is argued that this clause in the contract did not exempt the carrriers from
liability to the plaintiffs, because it was made without their knowledge or consent,
and was an attempted fraud upon their rights. But this is not so in point of fact,
so far as the defendants are concerned. The contract between them and the in-
sured was made before any insurance was obtained; and though it sought to
secure a right to the defendants in case policies were procured, yet on their part
no fraud was contemplated on the plaintiffs,-none is found by the Court. It is
true the case states that the plaintiffs did not know of the contract when they is-
sued their policies. That was a matter between them and the insured. If there
was any fraudulent concealment of facts on the part of the latter at the time they
obtained their insurances, it would have avoided the policies, and they would not
have been bound to pay the loss. If they paid it voluntarily, they are not entitled
to be subrogated."
In this case, as in the others, but one, considered, there was
no contract between the insured and insurer, at the time the
contract between the carrier and the insured was made, which
restrained them from modifying or entirely annulling the or-
dinary rule of subrogation if they saw proper to do so by
contract.
The cases referred to hold: (I) That contracts, such as
contained in the carrier's contract before us, are valid as be-
tween the carrier and shipper. (2) That a policy issued with
knowledge that the insured property is in transit, in the ab-
sence of inquiry as to the terms of shipment, misrepresenta-
tion as to this or other matter material to the risk, or fraud,
will be deemed to have been issued in subordination to the
contract of shipment, which may control the right of the
insurer to subrogation. None of them, however, hold that
a contract of insurance, existing when a contract of car-
riage is made, whether the carrier have knowledge of the in-
surance contract or not, can be controlled by a subsequent
contract between the insured and the carrier, and the insurer's
right to subrogation thus be destroyed, even when there is no
express provision in the policy which forbids this. It must
be that, in the absence of stipulation in a policy to the con-
trary, the insured may, without invalidating his policy, make
such contracts with a carrier, limiting the liability of the lat-
ter, as may be lawful under the laws in force at the place of
shipment, or such other laws as may be applicable; for the
parties ought to be presumed to contract with reference to the
right of the carrier to refuse to receive and transport freight
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without contract, limiting his liability in so far as this may
lawfully be done under the law governing the shipment. With
the carrier's liability lawfully restricted by contract, a loss re-
sulting from a cause within the restriction would not give
right of action in favor of the insured shipper against the car-
rier; and where this is the case there can be no subrogation
under the general principles applicable to the subject.
The contract relied on by the carrier in this case was not
,one it had the right to have made, or otherwise the right to
refuse to receive cotton for transportation; and it ought not to
be presumed that the parties to the insurance contract contem-
plated that the affreightment would be made practically at the
entire risk of the insurer, when the carrier had no right to in-
sist that this should be so, and when the. general rules of law,
with reference to which they ought to be presumed to have
contracted, fix on the carrier the ultimate liability for a loss
,occurring while the freight is in his hands, unless the loss
arises from a cause that relieves the carrier from liability. The
carrier's liability is held to be the ultimate liability, simply
because the loss of property, while in his custody as carrier,
results in fact or in legal contemplation from his failure of
duty, while that of the insurer is held to be that only of an
indemnitor, in all cases in which the insurance contract does
not stipulate to the contrary, or in which a contrary instruc-
tion may not fairly be inferred from the time and circumstances
of the contract. It seems to us, under the facts of this case,
leaving out of consideration the warranty contained in the
contract of insurance, that the right of the insurer to subro-
gation on payment of the loss is as well secured when there is
not, as well as when there is, an express contract that the right
to subrogation shall exist; and that a contract between the in-
sured and the carrier which defeats this right would defeat the
right of the insured or the carrier to recover at all upon the
contract of insurance. It has been held that, where a policy-
expressly gives the insurer the right to subrogation against
the carrier, a subsequent agreement between the insured and
the carrier that the latter shall be subrogated to the right of
the insured avoids the policy: Carstairsv. Izsurance Co. (1883),
U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Md., 18 Fed. Repr. 473. The correctness
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of this ruling was recognized in Jackson Co. v. Insurance Co.
(i 885), 139 Mass. 51I. If the insured wishes insurance that will
place the ultimate liability on the insurer, let him so make his
contract as to protect the carrier afterwards to be selected by
them; compensate the insurer for the increased risk of ultimate
loss; and be in position to contract with the carrier for reduc-
tion in freight, such as may be proper by reason of this shifting
of the ultimate risk of loss from the carrier to the insurer.
Passing from this, however, it is certainly true that the in-
sured could not confer on the carrier a right he did not pos-
sess. The warranty which the insurance company seeks to
assert to avoid liability to the carrier was one promissory in
character, in which the parties contracted "that this insurance
shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier." This, if a valid
-provision, cuts off any construction of the policy whereby it
could possibly be held to confer any right to benefit under
it on a carrier of the property insured, and it deprives the in-
sured of the power to confer on such carrier any right to bene-
lit under the policy by contract or otherwise. By the warranty
we understand the parties to have contracted that the contract
of insurance should be avoided-should cease to be operative
-if during the time specified for its continuance the insured
should so contract with a carrier of the property insured as,
between themselves, to give to the carrier any right to benefit
under the policy. The purpose of this provision evidently
was to deny, in terms, to the insured the right of power to
confer on the carrier any right to benefit through the policy,
such as the cases to which we have referred hold may be con-
ferred on the carrier by contract with the shipper made before
insurance is obtained. The insurer, in effect, says in the face
of the policy,-and to this the insured assents-
" This contract shall be binding on me only so long as you refrain from con-
tracting with any carrier you may employ to transport the insured property that
he shall have right to any indemnity from me for loss occurring, while the prop-
-erty is in his possession as carrier, from a cause which, under the rules of law ap-
plicable to the contract of carriage, would give you cause of action against such
carrier; and I will not be longer bound by this contract if you in any manner
release such carrier from that full liability to you and to me which will exist under
a lawful contract of affreightment for loss of the insured property while in his
baands as carrier."
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By requiring the carrier's liability to continue the ultimate
liability, the insurer doubtless intended to make the carrier's
own interest some guaranty against its own negligence or mis-
conduct. In the very act of making the contract through
which the carrier in this case claims, the policy ceased to be
of any effect whatever, as to the particular cotton at least, and
from that time forward neither the insured nor the carrier
could assert a right under it, based on the particular loss, if
the warranty was valid.
The Court below held that the warranty was invalid, be-
cause in restriction of trade, and against public policy. The
insurance company was under no legal obligation to issue a
policy at all, but, if it did, it had the right to place a provision
in the policy such as it did, and in so doing it neither contra-
vened any public policy nor restrained trade. It is said that
the carrier had no notice of the clause in the policy now relied
upon, and that for this reason it would be contrary to public
policy to permit it now to rely upon the warranty. The law
does not require that notice shall be given to third persons of
contracts of insurance, nor does it provide a mode in which
such notice may be given whereby all persons will be bound.
If the want of notice of a contract become important in a con-
test between a party to it and a third person, who has sought
to acquire by contract an interest or right antagonistic to the
right the former contract gives, it is not because the former
contract was illegal, but because some .equitable consideration
has arisen on account of which the person who has kept secret
his right ought not to be permitted to assert, it against one
whom he has misled by his silence. If the mere want of
notice of contracts would place them on the list of contracts
condemned because contrary to public policy, then there would
be a long list of condemned contracts, not heretofore even
suspected of illegality. The carrier knew that no right could
be acquired against the insurer through a contract with the
insured other than the latter possessed and had power to con-
vey, and if it desired to know the extent of that right it was
its duty to inquire. Appellee makes this inquiry: " Could
the insurance company and the owner of the cotton, without
the knowledge or privity of the carrier, make a contract be-
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tween themselves by which the carrier would be deprived of
its well-recognized legal rights ? Is not such a restriction
against public policy, and in restraint of trade?" Neither the
knowledge of nor privity of the carrier to the insurance con-
tract was necessary to its legality. The carrier had no legal
right, recognized or unrecognized, to.have the insurance
company or the insured to make any contract of insurance
whatever, much less to make one the insurance company was
under no obligation to make, and had refused to make. The
terms of the policy neither restrained appellee nor any other
carrier from making lawful contracts for carriage at any place,
nor from carrying them out anywhere; they simply denied to
the insured the right to make a contract which would bind the
insurer as the carrier desired it to be bound.
Two further inquiries and suggestions are made by appellee:
"Then, knowing the law,-knowing that the carrier had the
right to stipulate for the benefit of any insurance that may
have been effected,-knowing that the shipper could not refuse
to accept from th carrier a bill of lading with that provision,
-will appellant be permitted to receive premiums, and at the
same time insert a clause in its policy of insurance which
would exonerate it from the payment of any loss ?" "Appel-
lant refused to pay the policy to Callender & Magnus because
the same had been forfeited by their acceptance of the bill of
lading. This excuse might have had some force if they had
any option, but it was the law of Texas and the United States.
that the carrier had the right to issue such a bill of lading.
Callender & Magnus had no right to refuse to receive it." Ap-
pellant, corporation though it is, is affected with knowledge of
the law; but, admitting this, we think it cannot be charged
with knowledge that the propositions here made are the law.
It knew that the carrier might stipulate for the benefit of such
insurance as the insured had the power and right to convey;
but it did not know that the insured and carrier might make a
contract for it without its consent, and contrary to the express
stipulation of the policy. We think it did not know that the
shipper had not the right to.reject the bill of lading on which
appellee now bases its right, containing the clause in regard to
insurance; for we understand it was the right of the shipper
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to reject that bill of lading, and to have their cotton trans-
ported on one that did not contain that provision. A refusal
to give the carrier the benefit of insurance already secured,
would be, in effect, but a refusal to insure for the benefit of the
carrier, and this a carrier cannot require as a condition on which
it will receive and transport freight. If there be any question
of unearned premium, it is not presented in this case. The
policy having ceased to be operative, and that being the
foundation of all obligation on the part of the insurance
,company, the certificates subsequently issued, and transferred
subsequently to the loss, conferred no right on the carrier.
The judgment of the Court below will be reversed, and judg-
iment here rendered for appellant.
It is so ordered.
The consideration of the principal
-case involves at least four different ques-
tions: (i) The insurer's right of sub-
rogation. (2) The insurable interest of
-the carrier. (3) The effect of a stipu-
lation that the carrier shall have the
b nefit of the owner's insurance upon
goods consigned. (4) The effect of a
warranty in the policy that the insurance
shall not inure to the benefit of any
-carrier.
I. The iunszrer'.s right of subrogation.
.- It maybe accepted as settled law that
an insurer, upon payment of a loss,
"' becomes subrogated to all the assured's
rights of action against third persons
who have caused, or are responsible
for, the loss. No express stipulation in
the policy of insurance, or abandonment
by the assured, is necessary to perfect
the title of the insured. From the very
nature of the contract, the insurer, when
he ha. paid to the assured the amount
of the indemnity agreed on between
them, is entitled, by way of salvage, to
the benefit of anything that may be re-
ceived, either from the remnants of the
goods, or from damages paid by third
persons for the same loss :" .Phrnix
in. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co.
(1886), 117 U. S. 312; s.c., 25 AMER.
LAW REG. 330. "It is, as a general
principle, true," says DEvE,S, J., in
Jackson Co. v. .Ooylston Mitt. -is. Co.
(885), 139 Mass. 508, "that, if goods
are injured by transportation under such
circumstances that the carrier and the
insurer are alike liable therefor, and the
insurer pays for such injury, he will be
subrogated to such claim as the owner
may have against the carrier. And this,
apparently, because the liability of the
carrier is treated as primary, while that
of the insurer is secondary only. The
contract of insurance being one of in-
demnity, the insurer, when he has in-
demnified the insured, is equitably en-
titled to succeed to the right which he
had against the carrier."
The general principle stated in these
cases was long since recognized in Eng-
land in the cases of Randal v. Cockran
(1748), 1 Ves. Sr. 98; .ifason v. Sainr-
bury (782), 3 Doug. 61; Clark v. In-
habitants of Blything (1823), 2 B. & C.
254; Yates v. Vhyte (1838), 4 Bing.
N, C. 272. Following the English de-
cisions, Chief Justice SHAW held, in
Hart v. Western R. R. Corporation
(1847), 13 Met. (Mass.) 99, that an in-
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surance company, having paid a fire loss,
occasioned by sparks negligently com-
municated to the insured property from
a railroad company's locomotive, was
subrogated to the insured's right of re-
covery against the railroad. The prin-
ciple was again applied by Chief Justice
GIBSON, in Gales v. Hailman (1849),
Ix Pa. 515, to the case of goods lost
-while in the custody of a common car-
rier. In both of these cases it was held
that the action must be in the name of
the shipper, who, to the extent of the
indemnity received by him from his in-
surance, sues as trustee for the insurer.
The carrier cannot set up the payment
made by the insurer, as satisfaction, in
-whole or in part, of the claim, nor can
he call upon the insurer for contribution.
These decisions were followed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of goods destroyed by acci-
dental fire, while in course of transpor-
tation by a common carrier: Hall v.
Vashville &I C. R. R. Co., 13 Wall. (80
U. S.) 367, where the right of the insurer
to subrogation, admitted on the argu-
ment to prevail in cases of marine in-
surance, was held to apply equally to
cases of fire insurance upon land. The
general principle was again recognized
in The Potomac (183I), 1O5 U. S. 630 ,
and in Liverpool & G. W Steam Co. v.
-Phenix Lis. Co. (1889), 129 Id. 397.
In England the early decisions have
been consi.tently followed: White v.
Dobinson (1844), 14 Sim. 273; Dick-
enson v. Jardine (i868), L. R. 3 C. P.
639; Simpsoz v.Th omson (1877),L. R.
3 App. Cas. 279; Quebec Fire Assr. Co.
v. St. Louis (1851), 7 Mo. P. C. 286;
-Darrell v. Tibbitts (188o), L. R. 5 Q.
B. D. 56o. The two cases last cited
arose out of contracts of fire insurance.
Other cases in which the doctrine of
subrogation has been recognized as ap-
plying to rights of action against wrong-
doers, for damages done to property
which is the subject of insurance, are :
Rockingham A.Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bosher (1855), 39 Me. 253; Bean v.
Atlantic 6- St. L. .R. R. Co. (1870), 58
Id. 82; Connecticut Afut. Life Ins. Co.
v. New York &" N H. R. R. Co. (1856),
25 Conn. 265; Peoria .t&' F. Ins. Co.
v. Frost (1865), 37 Ill. 333; Afonmouth
County Afut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hutchin-
son (1870), 21 N. J. Eq. 107; Connec-
ticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry.Co. (1878),
73 N. Y. 399; Platt v. Richmond, Y
R. & C. R. R. Co. (1888), roS Id. 358;
Swarhout v. Chicago &- W. Ry. Co.
(i88o), 49 Vis. 625; Hustisford Farm-
ers' .11ft. Ins. Co. V. Chicago, Af. &- St.
P. Ry. Co. (1886), 66 Id. 58. The only
case which denies subrogation to the
insurer is Carroll v. New Orleans, _T 6-
G. N. R. R. Co. (1874), 26 La. An. 447,
which was the decision of a divided
Court, and has not been reaffirmed.
The facts of that case were very similar
to those of the principal case, the action
being against a common carrier for the
-value of cotton destroyed by fire while
in transit. In his dissenting opinion,
TALIAFERRO, J., says: "I am clearly
of the opinion the insurance company
stands subrogated by law to all the rights
of the owners against the carriers, as
they certainly are upon general princi-
ples of equity." In the case of Hart-
ford Ins. Co. v. Pennell (1878), 2 Bradw.
(Ill.) 609, the Court went so far as to
restrain the insured, at the suit of the
insurers, who had paid him the loss,
from making a settlement of his claim
against the alleged wrong-doer.
When the insurer, by reason of
the payment of the loss, has become
subrogated to the rights of the insured,
he may recover, in a suit against the
carrier, brought in the name of the in-
sured, the full amount of the loss or
damage, without regard to the amount
of the policy of insurance: Alobile &'
il. R.R. Co. v. Jirey (1883), III U.S.
584. And in such a suit the carrier
cannot defend on the ground that the
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insurer has failed to interpose a defense,
which might have been successfully
made to the claim upon the policy:
Sun Mid. Ins. Co. v. Js~issiJi Valley
Transp. Co. (U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Mo.,
1883), 17 Fed. Repr. 919.
2. Insurable inherest o] the carrier.-
A common carrier has an insurable in-
terest in the goods carried for hire by
him: Bitchv.Clh'sap5ea/ei Is.Co.(I828),
i Pet. (26 U.S.) 151 ; Crowleyv. Cohen
(1832), 3 B. & Ad. 478; London 6-
N W Ry. Co. v. Glyn (1859), 1 E. &
E. 652; Van Natta v. JAt. Security
Ins. Co. (1849), 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 490;
Chase v. Tashington 2fit. Ins. Co.
(1852), 12 Barb. (N.Y.) 595; Savage
v. Corn Exchange Fire &- I N. Ins.
Co. (1858), i Bosw. (N. Y.) i ; Eastern
R.R. Co. v. Relief Fire his. Co. (1868),
98 Mass. 420; Commonwealth v. Hide
and Leather Ins. Co. (1873), 112 Id.
136; Jackson Co. v. Boylston Afut. hns.
Co. (1885), 139 Id. 5o8. "It is well
settled that an insurable interest, in mer-
cantile language, does not necessarily
import an absolute right of property in
the thing insured. A special or quali-
fied interest is equally the subject of
insurance; and it has often been deter-
mined that each distinct interest in the
same subject may be protected by a
separate policy on the subject, for the
party interested in it. The mortgagor
and mortgagee may both insure; so may
the trustee and the cestni yue trust; and
so may every party who has any special
interest to protect, or who repre'ents
the property as the qualified owner of
it:" De Forest v. Fulton Fire ns. Co.
(1828), 1 Hall (N. Y.) 84. This case,
in which the principles involved were
most elaborately considered and which
has always been recognized as a leading
authority, determined the right of a com-
mission merchant to insure goods con-
signed to him for sale. But its reason-
ing is equally applicable to the case of
a carrier. Indeed, the carrier's interest
is greater than that of a commission.
merchant, for the carrier has not only a.
lien upon the goods for his transporta-
tion charge-, but he is absolutely liable,
as an insurer, to the owncr for their safe
delivery, unless destroyed by the act of
God or the enemy of the country:
Chase v. Washinglon Ma7ut Ins. Co.,
supra. If the carrier should recover
from the insurer an amount larger than
his interest in the goods, he would hold
the excess as trustee for the owner: De
For.st v. Ft/lon Fire Ins. Co., sitpra;
Wood on Fire Insurance, 514.
3. Effect of stipslation that the car-
rier shall have the benefit of the awnt r's
insurance.-The first case in which the
effect of such a stipulation in a bill of
lading was considered, was Mfercantile
at. Ins. Co. v. Calebs (1859), 20 N. Y.
173, which is cited in the principal case.
This was a case of inland marine insur-
ance. The underwriters brought suit
against the carriers for the value of
goods insured by the latter and lost
while in course of transportation, and
the carriers set up in defence to the ac-
tion a stipulation in the bill of lading
giving them "the benefit of any insur-
ance by or for account of" the owners
and insured. The Court (ALLEN, J.)
used the following language: "If there
had been no special agreement between
the insured and the defendants, under
the facts as found, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly have been entitled to re-
cover, if the defendants were liable for
the loss of the goods. * * * The ques-
tion then arises, was the special contract
between the insured and the defendants
a valid one? and if so, what is its effect
upon the plaintiffs' right to recover? It
has been frequently decided that a com-
mon carrier may, by special contract,
limit, restrict, or modify, his common
law liability as an insurer of the trans-
portation of goods. In the case of Gould
v. Hill (1842), 2 Hill (N. Y.) 623, a
majority of the Court held otherwise,
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but this Court, in Dorr v. New Jersey
Steal,, "az'. Co. (1854), II N.Y. 485,
held the contrary, and overruled the
-case of Gould v. Hill; and it had pre-
viously been repudiated in Parsons v.
Alonteath (85), 13 Barb. (N.Y.) 353,
and in Aloore v. Eval's (1852), 14 Id.
524 (see also Vew Jersey Steam Was'.
Co. v. Mferchants' B2ank (1848), 6 How.
(47 U.S.) 344). The Courtin all these
cases say that they see no reason why
parties may not contract as they please
in reference to the transportation of
goods; that such an agreement neither
changes nor interferes with any rule of
law, and does not affect public morals
or conflict with public interests. If the
owner chooses to take upon himself part
of the risk of transportation, and thereby
induces the carrier to convey for a less
rate of compensation, who has any right
to complain? It is a matter entirely
between themselves, unless it is the
result of a scheme to defraud third per-
sons. It has long been determined, both
in England and in this country, that
such an agreement is valid and binding,
and in the absence of fraud can at all
times be enforced."
The general rule here stated so
broadly, although still followed in New
York, has not been recognized to its
full extent by other jurisdictions: Aew
York Cent. R.R.Co.v. Loe.kwood(I873),
17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357; Ogdensburgy&
L. C. R. R. Co. v. Pratt (1874), 22 Id.
(89 U. S.) 123; Bank of Kentucly v.
Adams ExPress Co. (1876), 93 U. S.
174; Grand Trunk R'. of Canada v.
Stevens (1877), 95 Id. 655; Liver-
pool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co. (1889), 129 Id. 397; Forepaugh
v. Delaware, L. & W R. R. Co. (1889),
24 W. N. C. (Pa.) 385. But the cor-
rectness of the ruling which sustained
contracts similar to that now under
consideration, has never been disputed.
In Rintoul v. Arew Yrk Cent. 6- H. R.
R. R. Co. (U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y.,
1883), I7 Fed. Repr. 905; S. C., 21
Blatchf. 439, the same view of the law
was taken. This case was reported in
full in 23 A-tER. LAw REG. 294, with
a valuable annotation, in which the va-
lidity of such s'ipulations was discussed
at length. The annotator, in conclud-
ing, expresses some doubt as to whether
the rule there followed by Judge SHIP-
mAN was sound in principle or not. But
subsequent decisions have removed all
uncertainty from the question, and it
must now be regarded as accepted law.
In the year 1885 two cases were de-
cided, one in Texas and one in Massa-
chusetts, in each of which the validity
of the stipulation under discussion was
affirmed. In the former case, Brilisk
&' F. f. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, C. &, S. R
Rl).Co. (I885), 63 Tex. 475, it was said:
"The right to insert such a stipulation
as the present is universally admitted, or
denied, if at all, only on the ground of
the supposed effect it has of restricting
the common law liabil.ity of a carrier.
This, in our view, is not the effect of the
reservation. * * ir The right of the in-
surance company to recover against the
railroad company, if it existed at all, was
the result of an equitable subrogation to
the remedy of the owner of the cotton
against the carrier, and of the assignment
made subsequent to its loss. But the
assignment was worthless, as it was
made in privity and subordination to the
previous stipulation placed in the bill of
lading; and the subrogation was of no
avail, as no one can become subrogated
to a right which the party originally
possessing that right had previously con-
tracted should not be enforced." In
the other case, Jackson Co. v. .Boylston
01tt. IIIs. Co. (1885), 139 Mass. 508,
the Massachusetts Court places its de-
cision upon the following grounds: "As
the insurance company obtains its rem-
edy against the carrier, not by virtue of
any contract of its own with him, but
through the contract of the owner of the
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goods, such owner may make the con-
tract of carriage so as to suit his own
interest, provided there is no fraudulent
concealment from the insurer; and the
right which the insurer obtains is subject
to the agreement with the carrier. Car-
riers have an insurable interest in the
goods they transport, and may therefore
effect insurance ifpon them for their own
benefit. There is no reason why they
may not insure them jointly with the
owner, and, if so, why they may not
contract for the benefit of insurance
effected by the owner, in the absence of
fraud or any contract to the contrary
with the insurer. The owner is under
no obligation to contract so that he shall
have a remedy against the carrier under
every circumstance in which the carrier
has been held liable by the common
law. If he may accept a receipt excus-
ing the carrier from liability from fire,
and still hold the insurer, he may also
make a contract that the insurance shall
be for the benefit of the carrier."
In the case just cited it was also held
that the insured's contract to give the
carrier the benefit of the insurance was
not in violation of a condition of his
policy, prohibiting the sale, assignment,
transfer or pledge of such policy, or the
interest insured thereby, without the
written consent of the insurer. 1" The
policy and interest in it are still retained
by the owner; it is neither transferred
nor pledged. There is a collateral
agreement only, that the carrier, having
incurred a liability, shall have the benefit
of the insurance that may have been
effected :" Jackson Co. v. Boylston Miti.
Is. Co., suqpra.
As stated in the principal case, the
validity of contracts such as the one in
question was recognized in Tate v. H-
sop (1885), L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 368,
which was a case of marine insurance.
The insurer was accustomed to charge
a higher rate of premium upon ship-
ments under contracts giving no recourse
against the carrier, except for negli-
gence. This practice was known to the
insured, who failed, however, to inform
the insurer that he had entered into,
such a contract. His concealment of
this fact was held to have been fraudu-
lent and to have vitiated his policy.
The Supreme Court of the United
States in the case, already cited, of
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transporla-
ion Co. (I886),117 U. S. 32; S.C.,25
AMER. LAW REG. 330, have adopted
and followed the rule stated in the fore-
going decisions. The reasons for so
doing are thus clearly given in the
opinion of GRAY, J. : "The insurer
stands in no relation of contract or of
privity with such persons (i.e., the car-
riers). His title arises out of the con-
tract of insurance, and is derived from
the assured alone, and can only be en-
forced in the right of the latter. In a
court of common law, it can only be
asserted in his own name, and, even in
a court of equity or of admiralty, it can
only be asserted in his right. In any"
form of remedy, the insurer can take
nothing by subrogation but the rights of
the assured * * * . The right of ac-
tion against another person, the equita-
ble interest in which passes to the in-
surer, being only that which the as-
sured had, it follows that, if the assured
has no such right of action, none passes.
to the insurer; and that, if the assured's
right of action is limited or restricted
by lawful contract between him and the
person sought to be made responsible
for the loss, a suit by the insurer, in the
right of the assured, is subject to like
limitations or restrictions." The doc-
trine of this case was recognized very
recently in Live]pool & G. W. Steam
Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (I889), 129
U. S. 397.
The latest consideration of the ques-
tion, with the exception of the principal
case, was by the Court of Appeals of'
New York in Plat v. Richmond, .
INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA V. EASTON et a. 47
R. & C. R. R. Co. (t8SS), ioS N. Y.
358. The Court there expressly adopt
the reasoning of Justice GRAY, just
quoted. It may, therefore, be now re-
garded as settled law, that a stipulation,
giving a common carrier the benefit of
the shipper's insurance, is valid, and
that such a stipulation will operate to
defeat any claim to damages on the part
of the insurer, either by right of subro-
gation or by express assignment, for the
reason that the insurer, in either case,
takes only the rights of the insured,
subject to all his lawful engagements
and the limitations and restrictions of
his contract.
In The Sidney (U. S. C. Ct., S. D.
N. Y., 1885), 23 Fed. Repr. 88, it
was held, that it was not even ne-
cessary that the stipulation should be
inserted in the bill of lading, but that
it would "be equally valid when clearly
proved to exist by extrinsic evidence."
This case is cited with apparent ap-
proval in Phcenix Ts. .Co. v. Erie
Transportation Co., sitra.
The existence of such a stipulation
in the bill of lading will not, however,
operate as a defense to an action by the
owner, when it does not appear that he
has actually realized anything from his
insurance: Inman v. South Carolina
Ry. Co. (1889), 129 U. S. 128.
4. Efet of warranty that the in-
surance shall not inure to the beneit of
any earrier.-From the foregoing re-
view of the course of the decisions, it
will be seen that a common carrier is
now able to entirely defeat the insur-
er's right of subrogation, by the inser-
tion in its bill of lading of a stipulation
giving it the benefit of the insurance.
The practical operation of this principle
imposes upon the insurer the payment
of all losses by fire, suffered by goods
in course of transportation, and the car-
rier is protected, to the extent of the
insurance, without having made any
contract with the insurer or paid any
premium for the policy. To restore
themselves to the position which they
occupied before such stipulations had
been devised, insurance companies have
inserted in thcir pqlicies warranties that
the insurance shall not inure to the Len-
efit of any cartier. The validity and
effect of such a warranty were consid-
ered in the principal case, where the
question appears to have directly arisen
for the first time. The principles in-
volved have, however, been several
times the subjects of adjudication.
In the case of Carstairs v. Afechan-
ics' and Traders' Ins. Co. (U. S. C. Ct.,
D. Md., 1883), 18 Fed. Repr. 473,
there was a stipulation in the policy that
the insurer, in case of loss, should be
subrogated to all claims against the
transporter of the merchandise insured.
The insured contracted to give the car-
rier the benefit of the insurance. The
goods were lost while in transit and the
insurance company defended to the
claim of the insured, on the ground that
by his contract with the carrier he had
defeated the right of subrogation, and
rendered impossible the performance of
the stipulation in his policy. TheCourt
(MORRIS, J.) sustained this position,
saying: "If the plaintiffs should recov-
er in this suit compensation from the
insurance company, the agreement in
the bill of lading, if valid, has made it
impossible for them to do what, by both
the printed and the written clauses of
the policy, they agreed to do, namely,
to subrogate the insurance company to
their claim against the carrier. They
have, in effect, agreed with the insur-
ance company to subrogate it to their
claim against the railroad, and have alsG
agreed with the railroad to subrogate it
to any claim they may have against the
insurance company * * * . The insur-
ance company, being practically in the
position of a surety, and having a right
to the subrogation, and the plaintiffs
having, by the terms of the bill of lad-
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ing under which they claim the goods,
defeated that right, they cannot be al-
lowed to recover in this action."
The same question was involved in
the case of Iniman v. South Carolina
Ry. Co. (1889), 129 U. S. 128, which
was an action by the shipper against the
carrier to recover for goods lost by fire,
while in course of transportation. The
carrier alleged, in defence, that it had
not received the benefit of the plaintiff's
insurance on the goods, as stipulated in
the bill of lading. It appeared that
none of the insurance had been paid by
the companies, and that all the policies
provided for the transfer e owner's
claim against the carrier to the insurer
on payment of the loss, and that some
of them contained further provisions
forfeiting the insurance, in case any
agreement was made by the insured
whereby the insurer's right to recover
from the carrier was released or lost.
It was held by FULLER, C. J., that the
insured could have recovered upon his
policies only "upon condition of resort
over against the carrier, any act of the
owner's to defeat which operated to
cancel the liability of the insurers; they
(the policies) could not, therefore, be
made available for the benefit of the
carrier.",
The principle of these cases was again
recognized in Phenix Ins. Co. v. Par-
sons (1889), 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 423,
an action upon a policy of marine insur-
ance.
In two recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, the effect
of stipulations requiring the assignment
to the insurer of the insured's cause of
action, is strikingly illustrated. A trus-
tee had procured insurance upon a
building belonging to the trust estate in
two different companies. One policy
provided that, "when this company
shall claim that the fire was caused by
an act or omission of any person, town
or corporation, which created a cause
of action, the party to whom the loss is
payable under this policy, shall, on re-
ceiving payment, assign to this company
such cause of action." The other con-
tained no such provision. The property
insured was damaged by fire, originat-
ing from a gas explosion, which was
chargeable to the negligence of the gas
company, giving the owner a right of
action against the latter. Before pay-
ment upon the policies, the owner set-
tled with and released the gas company
from all claims arising out of the ex-
plosion, the release stipulating that it
was not to affect the claims of the own-
er against the insurance companies. He
then brought suit upon his policies. It
was held, in the case of the policy
which contained the condition requiring
an assignment of the insured's cause of
action, the opinion being by VILLIAIMS,
3., that the release of the gas company,
which made "performance of the cove-
nant to assign either impossible or use-
less, would felieve the insurance com-
pany of its concurrent covenant to
pay:" Wiagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Fideli-
t' Title and Trust Co. (1889), 123 Pa.
5 16. On the other hand, where there
was no express covenant to assign, the
mere existence of the equitable right
of subrogation would give the insurer
no claim to substitution until the liabil-
ity had been discharged. Therefore,
in the latter case, the release of the
wrong-doer would not constitute a de-
fense to the claim of the insured upon
his policy: Ins. Co. of North America
V..Easton (1889), 123 Pa. 523.
The authorities cited appear to estab-
lish the doctrine that, where the owner
of goods in transit contracts both to
give the carrier the benefit of his insur-
ance and also to assign to the insurer
his cause of action against the carrier,
he forfeits all claim upon his policy, but
may still recover against the carrier.
The principal case extends this doctrine
to policies in which it is warranted that
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-the insurance shall not inure to the ben-
efit of any carrier. In either case the
.carrier may, of course, be protected by
taking out a policy directly upon its
own interest in the goods.
It will be noticed that the policy in
the principal case, antedated the con-
tract of carriage. Whether a similar
warranty, in a policy issued subsequently
to the date of the bill of lading, would
have the same force, yet remains to be
decided. The principles laid down in
the various decisions here considered,
would seem, however, to require an
affirmative answer to this question.
A novel question, idvolving some of
-the subjects under discussion, arose in
Xidd v. Greenwich Ins. Co., C. Ct. U.
S., S. D. N. Y. (1888), 35 Fed. Repr.
35z. The insurance was upon certain
barrels of spirits and covered the excess
of value above $20 per barrel, less a
stipulated amount to be deductedin lieu
Of average. The policy provided that
the insured, by accepting payment,
would assign and transfer to the insurer
all his claim, by reason of the los,
against the carrier or others, to the ex-
tent of the amount paid him, and that
any act of the insured, waiving or tend-
ing to defeat or decrease anysuch claim,
whether before or after the insurance,
would operate to cancel the policy.
The insurer entered into an agreement
with the carrier that the spirits should be
carried at a stipulated valuation of $20
per barrel, the actual value being over
$97. The goods were burned while in
transit, and the owner received from the
carrier payment at the rate of $20 per
barrel. He then brought suit against
the insurance company for his loss in
excess of that amount. Defense was
made on the ground that, under the pro-
visions of the policy which have been
cited, the agreement to restrict the car-
rier's liability rendered the contract of
insurancevoid. Butthe Court (WHEEL-
ER, J.) held that these provisidns of the
policy did not mean "that all liability
of the carrier, which might arise, shall
be insisted upon and created and not
diminished from what it would be with-
out special contract, but that the claim
against the carrier, as it actually exists
in favor of the insured, shall not be
waived or diminished, and shall inure
to the benefit of the insurer. The policy
does not provide that any liability of the
carrier shall be perfected, but that, if
one is perfected, it shall remain for the
benefit of the insurer." Recovery was,
therefore, allowed. In view of the later
decisions, cited above, the soundness of
this rule must be considered doubtful.
JAMES C. SELLERS.
Supreme Court of iMiichigan.
BURTON v. TUITE.
A statute declared that the custodians of municipal records should furnish proper
and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examination of the records and files
in their respective offices, to all persons having occasion to examine them for any
lawful purpose, and also for making memoranda or transcripts therefrom during
business hours. Held, that under this statute, a person making and dealing in
abstracts of title has the right to examine the tax sales books in the city treasurer's
office.
The receiver of taxes in Detroit makes up an annual statement of his sales for
unpaid taxes and delivers it to the city treasurer, who notes therein such redemp-
tions as may be made, or the sale of any tax-bids. This statement is not one that
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is required by law. Held, that it is nevertheless a public record, and therefore
open to public inspection by citizens.
A public municipal corp6ration, like a city, can have no private books, not even
of accounts, that are not open to the inspection of its citizens.
The doings of a municipal corporation, and the doings of its officers, and the
records and files in their offices, must be open to public inspection by its citizens,
without charge.
It has never been a common law rule in the United States, that the public had
no right of free access to the public records, and to the public inspection thereof.
And no special interest in the subject-matter of the record need be shown, to entitle
one to such right.
A statute which confers a right upon "all persons," confers it upon any person.
Webber v. Yownley, 43 Mich. 534, overruled.
A public officer has no exclusive right, as against other citizens, to search the
records in his charge; and he has no right to exact fees for searches made, unless.
they ar made by himself or his subordinates.
Henry A. Chaney (Hoyt Post with him), for relator.
John W. McGrath and Edward Minock for respondent.
MoRsE, J., December 28, 1889. The relator asks for the
writ of mandamus, to compel the respondent to permit him to
inspect and examine the "records and files in the City Treasur-
er's office at Detroit, and to furnish proper and reasonable
facilities for such inspection and examination, and for making
memoranda and transcripts from such files and records, in
compliance with Act No. 205 of the Public Acts of 1889.
The Act in question,,reads as follows-
" That the officers having the custody of any county, city or town records in this
State, shall furnish proper and reasonable facilities for the inspection and examin-
ation of the records and files in their respective offices, and for making memoranda
or transcripts therefrom, during the usual business hours, to all persons having
occasion to make examination of them for any lawful purpose. Provided, That
the custodian of said records and files may make such reasonable rules and regula-
tions, with reference to the inspection and examination of them, as shall be neces-
sary for the protection of said records and files, and to prevent the interference with
the regular discharge of the duties of such officer. And trovided fierther, That
such officer shall prohibit the use of pen and ink, in making copies or notes of
records and files:" Public Acts of 1889, p. 286.
Relator shows in his petition that he is engaged in the ab-
stract business in the city of Detroit, and has invested a large
sum of money in said business; that his business requires that
he should know what taxes, levied by the city of Detroit, are
liens upon property of which he is furnishing abstracts, and by
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whom such liens, if any, are held; that when lands are sold for
unpaid taxes, the sale is conducted by the receiver of taxes. A
statement of such sales, in book form, is made by the receiver
and turned over to the City Treasurer, in whose custody it there-
after remains. When sales are redeemed or city bids sold,
such redemption is minuted in this book. That it is necessary
in said relator's business to frequently consult this book. If
proper facilities were granted him, he would not need to con-
sult the same more than ten minutes in any one day. That
the prevailing rule and custom is, in all the city and county
offices, to permit all persons to have free access to the records
therein, and he himself has ordinarily been allowed this privi-
lege, without obstruction or restraint, except in the case of the
respondent, who is City Treasurer of the city of Detroit.
That said respondent has frequently refused to permit re-
lator to inspect the sales books above referred to, as have also
his subordinates; and, if at times, an inspection of such rec-
ords has been granted, it has always been accompanied with
insulting language, implying that relator was taking time which
belonged to the public, and that he must hurry, or that the
books would be taken from him; and this, too, although no
other parties were present to be waited upon or attended to,
and though much more time was consumed by said treasurer
in making such complaints than would be necessary for relator
to inspect and make such memoranda as he needed, if he could
have access to the records without unreasonable interruption.
A clerk would be detailed to see that the relator did not mu-
tilate the records, with instructions not to permit relator to
take the books. But more frequently relator has been told by
the said city treasurer and his subordinates, that he could not
see the records. Respondent has followed this obstructive
course for a long time, to the great annoyance and discomfort
of relator, and in the face of the fact that there was posted in
his office a notice to the effect that all information desired by
the public would be cheerfully and promptly furnished. That
respondent at one time informed relator that it was a matter of
money with him, and that if relator would pay him twenty-
five dollars per month, relator could have what access he
pleased to the records in said treasurer's office.
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July 2, 1889, relator called at the treasurer's office at about
eleven o'clock, A. ix, and requested the privilege of inspecting
some of the sales books. Respondent asked if the information
wanted was for relator's private business. Relator replied that
Richard M. Coon was the owner of lot 24, in Wesson's sec-
tion of the Thompson farm, in the city of Detroit, and that he
had employed relator to see if certain tax sales, which had
been previously made, were still held by the city, or disposed
of, and if disposed of, to whom. Respondent requested relator
to write out what he wanted on a piece of paper, which he
did. The paper was handed to a clerk who was called by the
respondent to wait on relator. The parcel of land had been
sold in six successive years, and it became necessary to inspect
six different sales books. That the statement which relator
had made for the clerk, a copy of which he retained, informed
the clerk the number of the book required, the page of the
book and the line on the page which he desired to inspect.
That said clerk produced four of the books required, and they
were hastily inspected by relator, but he was not permitted to
handle them. "
During the examination, -;hich could hardly have occupied
ten minutes, respondent himself sat by, discussing the general
subject of relator's rights, and apparently in no wise hurried
by pressure of official duties. That after relator had inspected
the fourth volume, said clerk-taking his cue from the language
and actions of his employer, said respondent-abruptly, vio-
lently and unreasonably refused to produce the other two
books requested, and left the room. That relator then asked
the City Treasurer himself to produce the two books asked for,
but said treasurer refused. Relator then told respondent that
he would get the books himself, if he, respondent, would per-
mit him, relator, to go into the room where said books were,
for that purpose. Respondent told him he could not go into
that room, and absolutely refused to permit him to see the
books he desired. Relator offered respondent ten dollars per
month to be accorded such treatment as is accorded to the
public. Respondent refused the offer. Relator then formally
demanded the right to inspect the two books he had asked for
before, and reminded respondent of the Statute. Relator said
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that if he could not see the books, he should ask for a man-
damus. Respondent told him to "mandam," if he wanted to;
that the books were in the vault, and relator could not see
them, and that nothing but an order from the Common Coun-
cil would make him remove them. He told relator to leave a
written memorandum of what he wanted, and relator refused
to do this, as he had already furnished respondent with one
statement of what he required. Respondent became vocifer-
ous, declaring that he had disposed of the subject, refused to
hear anything further, and left the room. Relator then, under
the advice of counsel, made a new memorandum of what he
wanted and offered it to the Deputy Treasurer, who said he had
no time to attend to it. Relator told him he need not attend
to it then, as he would send his clerk for it, laid the memoran-
dum on the table, and placed a paper-weight upon it. Re-
spondent came in about then, in a high temper, and with some
profanity, ordered the relator out of the office, which order
relator obeyed. During the whole time of this interview, there
was no other person in the office on business, unless lie was
secluded in the private office of respondent.
The respondent, in his answer, denies that the books referred
to by relator are public records, or that they are made so by
charter, ordinance or law, or that they are required by law to
be kept, or that relator or any person, except respondent, is
entitled to the possession of said books, or entitled to take
them out of the custody of respondent, or to make extracts
from them, except under the immediate supervision of respond-
ent. He denies that it is the universal practice in city offices
to permit all persons desiring to inspect the said books to have
free access to them, or that such is the usage, or that such
usage has become so well established as to have the force of a
common law custom. He denies that relator has been ordi-
narily allowed to inspect such books without obstruction or
restraint, if by obstruction and restraint is meant a denial of
the right of access to said books without the supervision of
the city treasurer. He denies that the right which relator
seeks to establish is recognized or confirmed by any act of the
Legislature. He denies that at any time this respondent, or
by this respondent's direction or authority, any deputy or clerk
54 BURTON Y. TUITE.
in respondent's office has accompanied any inspection of the
books which relator has been allowed to make, with insulting
language. He denies that relator has been told by respondent
that he, the relator, could not see the records. He denies that
respondent has been guilty of obstructing relator. He denies
that respondent derives an income from abstracts amounting
to one thousand dollars per annum, or any such sum. He de-
nies that this respondent has ever said, that if relator would
pay respondent twenty-five dollars per month during his term
of office, the relator could have whatever access he desired to
the books in respondent's office. He denies that he made use
of the profane expression alleged by relator.
Respondent also sets forth in his answer, that relator is
seeking the information from the books as a matter of mer-
chandise to sell to others. That up to July 2, 1884, abstracts
could only be procured of the city treasurer, and that the
treasurer whose office expired in 1884, realized from. fifteen
hundred to two thousand dollars annually from tax abstracts,
and that he is informed relator paid such officer for the priv-
flege of making a copy of the books of said office, and did
make and use the same for private gain. That for one year
prior to July I, 1888, relator paid thirty-five dollars per month
for this privilege. That respondent has always been ready and
willing to give any lot-owner or citizen desiring it, information
as to tax charges upon lands, and has always done so free of
charge. He insists that he has the legal right to charge a
small fee for making out abstracts, as there is no law requiring
him to make them otherwise. That the books in question
have been kept for the information and convenience of the city
of Detroit, and are not required to be kept by the city charter
or any law or ordinance.
That each year, after the Receiver of Taxes makes sale of
lands for unpaid taxes, one of said books is made up by such
Receiver, and entered therein is the name of the owner, if
known; a description of each parcel of land; the amount of
the city tax, school tax, etc.; the total tax; the name of the
person to whom sold, which is usually the city of Detroit;
and said books also contain blanks for entry of assignment or
redemption; that there are in all thirty-seven books, con-
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taining from one hundred to two hundred and fifty pages each.
In addition, there are some sales books, containing memoranda
of sales for unpaid special assessments. There are also six-
teen (one for each ward) indexes to sales books, each of which
contains a description of each parcel of land in that ward, with
a column for each year, in which to enter, if sold, the number
of the page of the sales book for that year containing the
memoranda of the sale. If a sale has been cancelled, a red
ink line is drawn through the reference figures; that the
books so kept are easily subject to alteration or defacement.
That the books aforesaid are valuable, and the loss of the
same, or any of the same, would be irreparable; that respond-
ent is charged by the city with the care and custody of the
same; that a portion of respondent's office is kept for the use
-of the public, and the public is necessarily, by means of desks,
railings and wire work partitions, excluded from the private or
-working department of the office, and from the part contain-
ing the moneys, books and papers in respondent's office; that
relator, in order to use the right which he here seeks to estab-
lish, must necessarily be admitted to that portion of respond-
-ent's office from which the general public is excluded; that
the books referred to are kept by respondent in a vault in the
City Treasurer's office, and in the same vault are other valuable
books and papers, together with large sums of the city mon-
eys, varying in amount from one hundred dollars to thirty
thousand dollars; that to produce said books, and a number
-of them, as is often required by relator, requires a large amount
of time almost daily, and from ten to thirty minutes per day
have often been consumed in so doing; that respondent in-
sists that it is the duty of respondent, in order to protect him-
self and his bondsmen, to keep their books under the imme-
diate care, custody and supervision of himself or one of his
trusted employees; that during the month of July, relator's
purpose is not so much to look after individual cases of sales
as it is to compare his minutes of sale with the office memor-
andum of the same. Respondent submits that he is not obliged
to produce the books of his office, and supervise the inspec-
tiou of the same, to one who is collecting information for mer-
Ichandise, and that if he does do so, he is entitled to pay for it.
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He also submits, that in other public offices-in the office-
of the Register of Deeds, in the Probate Court, and in the
County Clerk's office-when information is furnished, which
the law does not require to be furnished, charges are made,
and legitimately, for such information. He also shows that
he has given bond for the safe keeping of these records; that
his total fees for abstracts for eleven months, ending Decem-
ber 31, 1888, were but two hundred and forty-three dollars.
And he finally submits, that relator is not entitled to access to
the books of respondent's office at his own pleasure; neither
is he entitled to frequent, or enter into, that portion of re-
spondent's office from which the general public is excluded ;.
that respondent is entitled to supervise the examination of the
books in his office, and that the relator, as a dealer in informa-.
tion, is not entitled to compel respondent to give his time to&
relator, at the pleasure of relator, for his gain and without
compensation to respondent.
It is evident, from the petition and answer, that there is more
or less of ill-feeling between these parties; and it is also clear
that the relator has been, in fact, denied free access to these
sales books, and that the respondent does not propose to per-
mit such access unless he is paid therefor; nor does he pro--
pose to furnish any facilities, reasonable or otherwise, to the
relator to inspect and examine said books, without pay.
This right of relator, claimed under the Statute, is denied,.
first, on the ground that these books are not public records,,
because there is no express statutory provision, anywhere,.
that such books shall be kept.
These books are made up, in the first place, by the Receiver
of Taxes, and by him handed over to the City Treasurer.
They are, therefore, books used and kept in two of the public
offices in the city of Detroit, and they must be considered'
public records. The claim that they are private books of ac-
count is absurd. They are neither the private books of the
Receiver of Taxes nor of the City Treasurer, and the city of'
Detroit, a public municipal corporation, can have no private
books, not even of accounts, not open to the inspection of its
citizens. Its doings, and the doings of its officers, and the
records and files in their offices, must be open to the public,
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nor can fees be charged for such inspection to those having
the right to examine and inspect such files and records.
But the broad ground is also taken that the relator has no
lawful right to inspect these sales books without recompense
to the respondent, because he is an abstract maker, and his
business may be, and is, in most cases, to sell to some person
the information gained by such examination; that he does not
come under the statute, because he does not have "occasion
to make examinations of them for a lawful purpose;" and that
this case is covered, and against relator, by two former decis-
ions of this Court: Webber v. Townley (1880), 43 Mich. 534;
Diamond Matcl Co. v. Powers (1883), 5i Id. 145.
If I understand the latter case, the writ of mandamus was
denied because the Diamond Match Company was not a citi-
zen, nor an inhabitant, nor even a domestic corporation. It
did not show its charter, nor give any evidence of its powers
or artificial capabilities. This Court say:
"We have no reason of knowing that it has capacity to buy lands, or hold them,
or deal in titles anywhere, or to carry on the business in which its petition alleges
it to be engaged; or to apply itself to such an enterprise as making a system of
abstracts of all the titles of all the real property in a county. The case is bare of
information in regard to the true legal status of the relator, and as to whether it is
other than a mere intruder in what it demands."
The petition of the relator alleged that it was incorporated
under the laws of the State of Delaware; that it had become
the purchaser of about thirty thousand acres of pine land in
the county of Ontonagon,.had erected extensive saw mills and
invested nearly two hundred thousand dollars, and was cutting
large quantities of pine and constantly purchasing more land,
and to provide against acquiring defective titles, desired to
protect its rights and interests by providing for itself an abstract
of all the lands in the county. The relator was permitted op-
portunity to examine and make abstracts as far as its own
ownership or interest was concerned, present or prospective,
but the dispute was whether it had the right to go further and
insist on having office accommodations and the handling of
all the records, to make an abstract of title to all the lands in
the county. While the writer of the opinion, Chief Justice
GRAvEs, paused to make some practical suggestions of obsta-
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dces in the way of proper relief being afforded by mandamus,
the ground of the denial of the writ was that the relator had
failed to show any title to the right it claimed, because the
authority given to it by the State by which it was created was
not disclosed, and could not be assumed. See Diamondj fatch
Co. v. Powers (1883), 51 Mich., at pages 147, 148. In the view
of the case above cited, I do not think that it is any authority
bearing against the relator's claim in this case.
And I cannot agree with the opinion of this Court, or the
reasons given for it, in Webber v. Townley, supzra. Nor do I
anticipate that hardly any, if any, of the results imagined by
the writer of that opinion, would ever occur, if the holding
were otherwise. If any of them should happen, the law is
,powerful enough to remedy them, and "Sufficient unto the
day is the evil thereof."
I do not think that any common law ever obtained in this
free government that would deny to the people thereof the right
of free access to and public inspection of public records. They
have an interest always in such records, and I know of no law,
written or unwritten, that provides, that before an inspection
or examination of a public record is made, the citizen who
wishes to make it must show some special interest in such
record., I have a right, if I see fit, to examine the title of my
neighbor's property, whether or not I have any interest in it,
or intend ever to have. I also have the right to examine any
title that I see fit, recorded in the public offices, for purposes
of selling such information, if I desire. No one has ever dis-
puted the right of a lawyer to enter the register's office and
examine the title of his client to land as recorded, or the title
of the opponent of his client, and to charge his client for the
information so obtained. This is done for private gain as a
part of the lawyer's daily business, and by means of which,
with other labors, he earns his bread. Upon what different
footing can an abstractor-can Mr. Burton-be placed within
the law, without giving a privilege to one man, or class of
men, that is denied to another?
The relator's business is that of making abstracts of title and
furnishing the same to those wanting them, for a compensa-
tion. In such a business it is necessary for him to consult and
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make memoranda of the contents of these books. His busi-
ness is a lawful one, the same as is the lawyer's, and why has
he not the right to inspect and examine public records in his
business as well as any other person? If he is shut out be-
cause he uses his information for private gain, how will it be
with the dealer in real estate, who examines the records before
he buys or sells, and buys and sells for private gain? Any
holding that shuts out Mr. Burton from the inspection of these
records, for this reason also shuts out every other person, ex-
cept the buyer, seller, or holder of a particular lot of lands, or
one having a lien upon it, or an agent of one of them, acting
as such agent without fee or reward. It cannot be inferred
that the Legislature irntended that this statute should apply
only to a particular class of persons, as, for instance, those only
who are interested in a particular piece of land. "Any person"
means all persons.
I can see no danger of great abuses, or inconveniences, likely
to arise from the right to inspect, examine, or make note of
public records, even if such right be granted to those who get
their living by selling the information thus gained. The in-
convenience to the office is guarded against by the statute,
which authorizes the incumbent to make reasonable rules and
regulations with reference to the inspection. And when abuses
are shown, there will no doubt be found by the Legislature, or
the courts, a remedy for them.
It is plain to me that the Legislature intended to assert the
right of all citizens, in the pursuit of a lawful business, to make
such examination of the public records in public offices as the
necessity of their business might require, subject to such rules
and restrictions as are reasonable and proper under the cir-
cumstances.
The respondent in this case is the lawful custodian of these
sales books, and is responsible for their safe keeping. And he
may make and enforce proper regulations, consistent with the
public right, for the use of them. But they are public prop-
erty, for public use, and he has no lawful authority to exclude
any of the public from access to and examination and inspec-
tion thereof at proper seasons. It follows that he has no right
to demand any fee or compensation for the privilege of access
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to the records, or for any examination thereof, not made by"
himself or his clerks or deputies. He has no exclusive right
to search the records, as against any other citizen: Lum v.
.ikcCal-ty (1877), 39 N. J. L. 287 ; Boylan v. Warren (I888), 39
Kan. 3oi; Colev.Racliac (1887), 37 Minn. 372; GermanLoan
and Trust Co. v. Richards (885), 99 N. Y. 620; Hanson v.
Eiclstaedt (1887), 69 Wis. 538.
It follows, in my opinion, that the prayer of the petitioner
must be granted, and the writ issue as prayed, the relator ask-
ing in this writ no more than the statute gives him.
CHAMPLIN, J., concurred.
CAMPBELL, J.: I think relator has such an interest as entitle&
him, under the law of 1889, to see the'book in question, and
confine my opinion to that point.
SHERWOOD, C. J., and LONG, J., did not sit in this case.
This annotation is confined to a dis-
cussion of the statutes) and decisions
thereunder, of the various States, where
abstract companies and private persons
have sought the free and constant use
of the public records, in the course of
compiling and keeping up, for profit, a
statement of all the titles to land, in a
city, township, county, or other local
division of a State: that is-
Alabama, pp. 64,66.
Colorado, p. 67.
Georgia, pp. 64, 67, 68.
Kansas, pp. 63, 66.
Michigan; pp. 49, 65, 67.
Minnesota, p. 62.
New Jersey, pp. 6o, 65, 67.
New York, p. 66.
Pennsylvania, p. 65.
Wisconsin, pp. 61, 68.
The public nature of the public re-
cords of private documents was well
explained in one of the decisions cited
in the principal case. "The [county]
clerk is the lawful custodian of the
records, and indexes thereto, and is re-
sponsible for the safe keeping thereof.
His powers over them are such as are
necessary for their protection and pres-
ervation. To that end, he may make
and enforce proper regulations, con-
sistent with the public right, for the use
of them. But they are public property,
for public use, and he has no lawful
authority to exclude any of the public
from access to, and inspection and ex-
amination thereof, at proper seasons, and
on proper application. The clauses
which declare the public right in this
behalf, employ the most comprehensive
and general language: 'All persons de-
siring to examine the same,' 'Every-
person shall have access,' etc. It fol-
lows that the clerk has no right to de-
mand any fee for the privilege of access.
to the records and indexes, or for any
examination thereof, not made by him-
self or his assistants. He has no exclu-
sive right to search the records:"
RUNYON, C., IueM v. .l'cCarty (1877),.
39 N. J. Law 287, 290. The party re-
fused was an attorney, not engaged in
abstracting, and had been refused access
to the records until he paid, under pro-
test, the fees chargeable if the clerk had
made the search. This suit was to re-
cover the sum paid, and was successful.
The New Jersey Staute,-, under which
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ihe aforegoing case was decided, provide
(Revision of 1877, p. 157)-" 25. That
the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas
of the county shall record, in large, well-
bound books of good paper, to be pro-
vided for that purpose and carefully
preserved, all deeds and conveyances
of lands, tenements and hereditaments,
lying and being in the said county, ac-
knowledged or proved, and certified to
have been acknowledged or proved in
manner aforesaid, which shall be deliv-
ered to him to be recorded; and, also,
all other instruments which are by this
Act directed therein to be recorded; to
which books every person shall have
access at proper seasons, and be entitled
to transcripts from the same, on paying
the fees allowed by law."
And (Id. 705)-" 17. The clerk of
the Court of Common Pleas of every
county of this State shall, from time to
time, provide fit Looks, well bound and
lettered, for registering all mortgages
and defeasible deeds in the nature of
mortgages, of lands, tenements and
hereditaments, lying and being within
his coun:y, in which shall be entered
the names of the mortgagor and mort-
gagee, the date of the mortgage, .the
mortgage money and when payable, and
the description and boundaries of the
lands, tenements, and hereditaments,
mortgaged; that the said clerk shall,
immediately on receiving the said mort-.
gage, make the said entry or abstract in
the register, and shall note in the margin,
or at the foot of such abstract, the day
of the month and the year when the
said mortgage was delivered to him or
brought to his office to Le recorded; to
which book every person shall have ac-
cess atproperseasons, and maysearch the
same, paying the fees allowed by law."
Another of the citations in the prin-
cipal case, would seem to indicate that
at least one public officer was made to
feel his duty, first, by the action of the
individual, and then, by the denial of
an injunction to restrain the abstractor:
Hanson v. .Eichstaedt (887), 69 Wis.
538.
The Revised Statutes of Wisconsin
(chap. 37, p- 247,) provide-" SECTION
7oo. Every sheriff, clerk of the circuit
court, register of deeds, county treas-
urer and county clerk, shall keep his
office at the county seat, and in the
office provided by the county or by spe-
cial provisions of law; if there be none
such, then at such place as the county
board shall direct; and shall keep such
office open during the usual business
hours each day, Sundays and legal hol-
idays excepted; and with proper care,
shall open to the examination of any
person, all books and papers required
to be kept in his office, and permit any
person so examining, to take notes and
copies of such books, records or papers,
or minutes therefrom; and if any such
officer shall neglect or refuse to comply
with any of the provisions of this sec-
tion, he shall forfeit five dollars for every
day such noncompliance shall continue.
Actions for the collection of the forfeit-
ure herein provided, may be brought in
all cases of such refusal or neglect, in
the manner provided by law, upon the
complaint of the district attorney of the
proper county, or of any party aggrieved
by such neglect or refusal."
Commenting on this section, CASSO-
DAY, J., said-" This language, literally
construed, certainly includes the defend-
ant. The words ' any persons,' when
so construed, are distributive, and in-
clude every person. By what authority,
then, are we to construe these words as
only applicable to a particular class of
persons, as, for instance, those only who
are interested in the particular piece of
land, the record of which is sought to
be inspected or copied? If so, how is
the fact of such interest to be deter-
mined-by the applicant, or by the
register? Is the register to accept,
without question, the statement of the
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applicant, or may he require other evi-
dence ? Of course, every statute is to
be construed with reference to its object
and subject-matter; and in that way, it
frequently occurs that general words
are limited in their operation: W ilb.
Stat. Laws, 173-177. Here the sub-
ject-matter is the examination of the
public books and records in the regis-
ter's office, and the taking of notes,
minutes, and copies therefrom; and the
statute requires the register, under a
penalty, to permit any person to so ex-
amine and take notes, minutes and cop-
ies. Under such a statute, can we say
that when a respectable person, in a
respectful manner, applies to the regis-
ter to make such examination, etc., he
is to be excluded, merely because he
does not belong to some class of per-
sons unnamed or undefined in the stat-
ute; or, if permission is given, is his
examination, etc., to be confined to
lands in which he, or his clients, have
a present pecuniary interest."
And distinguishing the Alabama and
Michigan cases (hfra, pp. 64, 57), the
same judge said-" On the contrary, we
must hold that our statute in question
extends such right of examination, etc.,
to 'any person' applying to such cus-
todian of public records in a proper
manner; subject, however, to the pay-
ment of fees, when allowed, and such
reasonable supervision and control by
such officer as are essential to the con-
venient performance of his duties and
the current business of the public: It
may be that more definite regulations
should be made in such matters, but
that is a question for the Legislature,
and not for us."
Another citation in the principal case
is valuable as recognizing the object in
view of the Legislature in passing the
statute: State ex rel. v. Rachac (1887),
37 Minn. 372. Here the Court decided
that those who are in the business of
making and furnishing abstracts of title
to others for compensation, along with
other persons, whether interested in
such records or not, all alike, have the
right to examine and abstract the rec-
ords of the register of deeds, in the
manner provided by Gen. Stat. 1878, c.
8, 179, as amended by Laws of 1885,
c. 116; that is (Gen. Stat., vol. 2, p.
'33)-" '79. The register shall ex-
hibit, free of charge, during the hours
that his office is, or is required by law
to be open, any of the records orpapers
in his official custody, to the inspection
of any person demanding the same,
either for examination or for the pur-
pose of making or completing an ab-
stract or transcript therefrom; provided,
that whenever, in the opinion of the
board of county commissioners, it is for
the benefit of the people of their coun-
ty, that any person, company or cor-
poration, who has or may have a set of
abstracts of title, should be permitted to
occupy any part of the county building
for an office, such board may, by reso-
lution, give such person, company or
corporation permission so to do. And
in every such case, such board shall re-
quire of such person, company or cor-
poration a bond in a sum not less than
five hundred dollars, nor more than
five thousand dollars, with two or more
sureties, to be approved by the com-
missioners, conditioned that such per-
son, company or corporation will handle
all public records belonging to the
county with due care, and will not
charge any greater fee for making ab-
stracts than is or may be allowed the
register of deeds for like services and
for the faithful performance of his duties
as an abstractor: provided further, that
nothing contained in this act shall be
construed as giving any person the right
to have or use the said record for the
purpose of making or completing an
abstract or transcript therefrom when it
would interfere or hinder the register of
deeds in the performance of his official
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duties, or as permitting any person to
take any of said records from the regis-
ter of deeds' office without his consent.
But no register of deeds is bound to
record any deed, mortgage or other in-
struments unless the fees therefor are
tendered him in advance."
Commenting upon the amendatory
act, MITCHELL, J., said-" While its
operation is not confined to those en-
gaged in the so-called ' abstract busi-
ness,' yet, in its language and general
scope, it shows that these were promi-
nently in the mind of the Legislature.
The original statute gave to every one
demanding it, the right 'to inspect'
these records. But, as there might be
doubt what the rights of inspection
included, the amendment adds, ' either
for examination or for the purpose of
making or completing an abstract or
transcript therefrom. As indicating
what and whom the Legislature had in
mind, the act further provides, that the
county commissioners may permit any
person having a set of 'abstracts of
title' to occupy a part of the county
building for an office :" 37 Minn. 374.
Where the question was decided ad-
versely to the right of an abstractor to
make copies of the entire records of the
office of a register of deeds (Cormack
v. Wolcott, 1887, 37 Kan. 391), CLOY-
sToN, C., admitted that the question
was an embarrassing one, and that the
Court was "not free from doubt. At
common law, parties had no vested
rights in the examination of a record of
title, or other public records, save by
some interest in the land or subject of
record. So no authorities at common
law can throw any light upon this ques-
tion-the practice of making abstract
records being of more recent date :"
P. 394. This decision was affirmed in
Boylan v. Warrent (x885), 39 Kan.
301, to the extent that the register of
deeds will not be compelled by man-
damus to permit any person to make
copies of the entire records in his office,
for the purpose of making a set of ab-
stract books for private use or specula-
tion. "The refusal of the officer in
charge, to permit a person to gratify a
mere idle curiosity, or to examine the
records for the mere purpose of taking
copies or metoranda thereof, for some
supposed possible use in the future, or
to examine the records, when they are
otherwise rightfully and properly in use
by some other person, cannot consti-
tute a basis for any kind of action.
Some present and existing riz/st of
a person must be infringed to the
injzzry of such person, before any cause
of action of any kind can accrue in his
favor :" VALENTINE, 3., p. 305.
These decisions were based upon
Art. 15, C. 25, Comp. Laws of Kansas,
I88I, which provide-" SEC. 172. Ev-
ery county officer shall keep his office
at the seat of justice of his county, and
in the office provided by the county, if
any such has been provided; and if
there be none established, then at such
place as shall be fixed by special pro-
visions of law; or, if there be no such
provisions, then at such place as the
board of county commissioners shall
direct, and they shall each keep the
same open during the usual business
hours of each day (Sundays excepted);
and all books and papers required to
be in their offices, shall be open for the
examination of any person; and if any
of said officers shall neglect to comply
with fhe provisions of this section, he
shall forfeit, for each day he so neg-
lects, the sum of five dollars : Provided,
That in counties of less than five thou-
sand inhabitants, the probate judge
shall not be compelled to keep his office
open at the county seat, except at the
regular term, except the county com-
missioners shall so order."
But still, in the latter case (Boylan
v. Warren), the Court was careful to
say: "Before closing this opinion, it
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-would, perhaps, be proper to state that
'any person,' even an abstracter of titles,
-who may have sufficient interest in the
information to be obtained from the
'public county records to entitle him to
.n examination of the same, may, if he
chooses, make copies, abstracts, extracts,
-or memoranda therefrom. There is no
statute and no good reason against it :"
p. 307.
The same denial of inspection of the
records of a probate judge, on the ground
that the purpose was speculative, or from
idle curiosity, was reached in Rando1 1
v. The State (1886). 82 Ala. 527, 529.
The relators were dbstracters and de-
sired to abstract all the titles to real
estate in the county, claiming a right so
to do under section 698 of the Code of
1876 (Code of 1887, chap. 5, P. 235)-
" 791. (698.) The records of the office
[of the judge of probate] must be free
for the examination of all persons, when
not in use by the judge." The same
chapter also provides--." 789. (695.) It
is the duty of the judge of probate,--7.
,On application of any person, and the
payment or tender of the lawful fees, to
give transcripts of any paper, or record,
required to be kept in his office, properly
certified."
In deciding this case of .Randolp v.
The State, the Conit felt bound to limit
their previous decisions in Brewer v.
Watson (1882), 71 Ala. 299, and Phelan
v. The State (1884), 76 Ala. 49; these
decisions related to other offices, not
open to free statutory examinations.
Here the Court thought it expedient to
point out that they had not had before
them the claim of right to make mem-
oranda, and said: "We must not, how-
ever, be understood as intending to
abridge the right, conferred by statute,
of ' free examination,' by all persons
having an interest, of the records of the
probate judge's office. Nor will we
confine this right to a mere right to in-
spect. He may make memoranda, or
copies, if he will, and, to this end, may
employ an agent or attorney. The lim-
itation is, that he must not obstruct the
officers in charge in the performance of
their official duties, by withholding re-
cords from them when needed for the
performance of an official function. Nor
is this right of examination confined to
persons claiming title, or having a pres-
ent pecuniary interest in the subject-
matter. It will embrace all persons
interested, presently or prospectively, in
the chain of title, or nature of incum-
brance, proposed to be investigated.
The right of free examination is the rule,
and the inhibition of such privilege,
when the purpose is speculative, or from
idle curiosity, is the exception:" 82
Ala. 529.
The same sentiments were expressed
in Buck &- SPencer v. Collins (1874),
51 Ga. 391. In this State, the Code
provides (ed. 1882, p. 9)-"8 14. All
books kept by any public officer under
the laws of this State, shall be subject
to the inspection of all the citizens of
this State, within office hours, every day,
except Sundays and holidays." This
was enacted in 1831, long before the
days of abstracts and other modern con-
veniences; and the Court (opinion by
McCAY, J.,) denied the right to make
the abstracts, as "a perversion of the
purpose for which the books are kept.
* * * It is an unnecessary flaunting of
private matters before the public gaze :"
Id. 394-
The absence, at common law, of any
general or public right of inspl-ction of
public records [I Greenlf. Ev. a 473-5],
was also made the foundation of the
overruled case of PWbber v. Towznly
(supra, p.57), in Michigan. MARSTON,
C. J. : "The right to an inspection, and
copy, or abstract of, a public record, is
not given indiscriminately to each and
all who may, from curiosity or otherwise,
desire the same, but is limited to those
who have some interest therein. What
BURTON V. TUITE.
'that interest must be, we are not called
upon, in the present case, to determine.
'The question has usually arisen where
the right claimed was to inspect, or ob-
tain a copy, of some particular document,
,or those relating to a given transaction,
-or title. We have not been referred to
any authority which recognizes the right
-of a person, under the common law, to
,a copy, or abstract, of the entire records
,of a public office, in which [as in this
ease] he had no special interest, the
cbject in view being simply private gain
from the possession and use thereof.
'The object sought by the relators may
be considered as of such modem origin
us not to have been contemplated, or
covered, by the common law authorities
relating to the inspection of public re-
-cords, and the reason upon which those
authorities rest, would exclude relators
from the right claimed :" p. 537.
The Court made no citations, but the
more important of the citations of coun-
sel may be found in one of them: State
v. Williams (1879), 41 N. J. Law 332;
S. C., 19 AMER. LAw REGISTER 154.
As Webber v. Town'ey was decided
-under the Act, No. 54, approved March
26, 1875 (Laws, p. 5 ), it is only neces-
sary to add that this Act differs from the
Act of 1889 only in the words "registers
-of deeds in this State" throughout the
Act, and the use of "may" for " shall"
in the last proviso.
The only reasonable ground for the
refusal, by a servant of the people, of
public information to any citizen, was
expressed by GRAVES, C. J., in the Dia-
mond .fatch Co. v. Powers (supra, p.
57)---"A single consideration of a prac-
tical nature may be suggested here.
Granting that no other difficulties ap-
pear, it seems evident that, in any case
where the claim is for a continuous use
of the record office and its public con-
tents, from day to day, and week to
week, and not merely for a single occa-
,sion, with all its material facts defined,
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there must be great, if not insuperable,
difficulty in enforcing the claim by man-
damus. The register [of deeds of the
county] has rights and duties which
must be respected; so the general public
have rights as well as the claimant; and
the conditions are not steadily the same.
They are subject to variation. On every
occasion, each must act reasonably, and
with proper regard for the rights and
duties of the others."
In the City of Philadelphia, the re-
cords of the Recorder of Deeds have
been examined three times, and those of
the Register of Wills and the Prothono-
tary of the Courts, twice; though with
much wear upon the books for the time,
still, on the whole, with little inconve-
nience above those inseparable from the
use of the record books by a large num-
ber of persons at once. This occurred
chiefly from a spirit of accommodation
,shown after the decision by the local
Court of Common Pleas (No. 2) in
Comm. ex re. v. O'Donnel (1882), r2
NV. N. C. (Pa.) 291; S. c., 15 Phila. 197,
where the Recorder of Deeds refused to
a title insurance company immediate
information of the filing for record of
every deed or writing brought into his
office, on the ground that the company
used the information to issue certificates
of search in rivalry with those issued by
the Recorder, and those reducing the
aggregate of the fees paid into the city
treasury. But the Court awarded a per-
emptory mandamus. The case turned
almost entirely upon the right of the
title company, along with other citizens,
to purchase a certi3cate of all deeds
and writings filed for record, immedi-
ately after their filing. The ordinary
certificates of search were usually three
or four days behind the legal period of
recording.
In the case overruled (Webber v.
Townley, Supra, p. 58), MARSTON, C.
J. thought that he expressed some other
reasons for denying access to the records,
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when, conceding to the relators the right
to abstract the entire records of a public
office, he asserted the same right be-
longed to all persons, without restriction
of residence, "so that the result may be
more applicants than the register's office
could afford room to. * * * * And, as
the use of the public records cannot thus
be handed over to the indiscriminate use
of those not interested in their future
preservation, how shall the register pro-
tect them from mutilation ?" Very much
the same sort of language was used by
CLOYSTON, C., in Cormack v. Wolcott
(supra, p. 63), and by STONE, C. J',
Phelan v. The State (1884), 76 Ala.
49,51-
But such reasons are obviously so in
theory only, and were practically an-
swered in the principal case: (supra, p.
59), as well as in The People ex rel. v.
Richards (1885), 99 N. Y. 620, where
the register set up that he had given,
accommodation to three employes of the
title company, and had no room for
more. The statute of that State provides
that such records shall "at all proper
times be open for the inspecticn of any
person paying the fees allowed by law"
(chap. 41o, Act July 1, 1882, 1759;
also H 1742, 1747 and 1751). The
Court sustained the refusal, saying:
"He must transact the current bu'iness
of the office, and allow all persons rea-
sonable facilities to exercise their rights
in his office. * * He must have some
right to say how many persons the
relator could send there, to work at one
time:" EARL, J., p. 623.
Commenting upon the Act of 1882,
DANIELS, J., declared that "The obli-
gation imposed upon the register, to
permit the books, records, and maps of
the office to be examined, is absolute in
its character. * * * * The duty imposed
upon him, in this respect, is entirely
ministerial, and its observance may be
lawfully required through the instru-
mentality of the writ of mandamus. *"
It is not his duty to permit the office to-
be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books or papers, but it is
his duty to regulate, govern and control
his office in such a manner as to permit
the statutory advantages to be enjoyed
by other persons not employed by him
as largely and extensively as that con-
sistently can be done. He has no prop-
erty in these books or papers, but is their
mere custodian, whose duty it is securely
to preserve and maintain them for the
benefit, advantage and convenience of
the public. And, in the exercise of his
discretion, it should undoubtedly be done
with a view to securing these ends. It
cannot be made the pretense or excuse
for the arbitrary exclusion of any person
from his office, whose duties require
their services there. What the law ex-
pects and requires from him is the exer-
cise of an unbiased and impartial judg-
ment, by which all persons resorting to
the office, under legal authority, and
conducting themselves in an orderly
manner, shall be secured their lawful
rights and privileges, and that a corpor-
ation formed in the manner in which the
relator has been shall be permitted to
obtain all the information, either by
searches, abstracts, or copies, that the
law has entitled it to obtain :" People
ex rel. v. Reilly (1886), 45 Hun (N. Y.)
429, 434.
The objection arising from a reason-
able use of the public records by a
number of citizens, was thus effectually
answered in a case of a mere citizen
and the records of a street commissioner,
by BARNARD, J., in The People v. Cor-
nell (1866), 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 329,334:
"It would be v eryinconvenient to allow
every citizen that chooses so to do, to
come into the office and inspect docu-
ments, and make copies of them; and
it is suggested that if they be allowed.
so to do, larger accommodations and
larger clerical force would be required.
I do not understand that there is any
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"veryserious difficulty in procuring larger
accommodations and more clerical force,
if that should be found necessary. But
this is a mere anticipated difficulty,
which I apprehend will not practically
,occur. Ifit should occur, I see nodiffi-
•culty in providing means to remove it."
Contrary to a right of reasonable use
of the public records, is Bean v. The
Peoftie (1883), 7 Col. 200. The claim
•of right to abstract the entire records of
a county was denied, though no aid was
xequired from the recorder; "for he is
charged by statute with the safe keeping,
and preservation of the records, and is
responsible for their truthfulness, and
freedom from mutilation :" HELm, J.,
p. 2o. Not that the Court insinuated
either generic or individual traits of mu-
"tilation, because the opinion proceeds:
"We think the business of relators [who
were abstracters] should be treated as
any other legitimate [sic] private enter-
prise. There is no law to prevent the
clerk aiding them, if he chooses so to
do, either gratis, or for a stipulated com-
pensation; provided he does not neglect
his official duties. But the Court should
not, by mandamus, compel him to do
this against his will :" p. 202. This is
the same sort of argument so well an-
swered by the Scripture quotation in the
principal case (p. 58, suPra).
This decision, however, is based upon
the interpretation of the General Stat-
utes of the State (chap. xxiii, p. 285,
ed. I883), which provide-" SEC. 667.
Every sheriff, county clerk, county
treasurer and county judge, shall keep
his office at the county seat of his coun-
ty, and in -the office provided by the
,county, if any such place has been pro-
vided; and if there be none estab-
lished, then at such place as shall be
ixed by special provision of law; or,
if there be no such provision, then at
such place as the board of county com-
missioners shall direct; and they shall
each keep the same open during the
usual business hours of each day, Sun-
days and legal holidays excepted, and
all books and papers required to be in
their office, shall be open for the exam-
ination of any person; and if any per-
son, or officer, shall neglect to comply
with the provisions of this section, he
shall forfeit, for each day he so neglects,
the sum of five dollars."
The Court said-" We feel confident
that an examination of the statute is
proper, with the view of determining
whether or not the Legislature intended
to grant the privilege here claimed."
And after stating fear for the integrity
of the records, "We are of opinion that
the statute in question was not designed
to allow individuals who wish to ab-
stract the entire records, for future
profit in their private business, the priv-
ilege of using continuously the public
property, and of monopolizing, from
day to day, for months and years, a
portion of the time and attention of a
public officer, against his will, and
without recompense. In support of the
foregoing reasons and conclusions, see
.Buck v. Collins (supra, p. 64), and
Webber v. To'wnley (szra, p. 58),"-
pp. 200, 202.
The same sentiments were expressed
by HAINES, J., in deciding Flemning v.
Clerk afHudson County (1863), 30 N.
J. Law 280, 281; but this was in the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Errors
.and Appeals ruled the other way in
Lum v. McCarty (supra, p. 60).
The same unnecessary fears for the
safety of records inspected "under the
watchful observation of the clerk,"
without paying the fees prescribed in
the Code, were expressed in Buck
Spencer v. Collins (siepra p. 64). In
that State (Georgia), Section 3695 of
the Code (ed. 1882, p. 949), prescribes
the fees for "exemplification of record
* * * for inspection of books, when
their [the clerks of the Superior Courts]
service is required, * * * for examination
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of record and abstract * * 2" This part
of the fee bill, "by implication, permits
any citizen to make an inspection, with-
out fee, if he does not require the
clerk's aid: * * * All laws are to be
reasonably construed, in view of the
object of them, and in view of other
laws. The object of this permission to
i4sect, without fee, if no aid is re-
quired from the clerk, is plain. It is
contemplated that lawyers, public offi-
cers and persons familiar with the books,
by having frequent occasion to use
them, may not need the clerk's assist-
ance for the purpose. And, by impli-
cation, this permission contemplates
that the clerk shall, in such cases, make
no charge for simply standing by and
noticing that no improper interference
with the record is had. But there is
nothing in this implication (and that is
all it is, at best) which authorizes the
clerk to permit even an inspection, ex-
cept in his own presence, or in the
presence of his sworn deputy. He is
required [Code, ed. 1882, p. 68], sec-
tion 267 [9], "To keep all the books,
papers, dockets and records, belonging
to their [his] office, with care and se-
curity, *** * ." He cannot do this,
if any person may handle or inspect
them, otherwise than under his own
eye. In our judgment, any clerk would
be guilty of a failure in his official du-
ties, should he permit any person, if
only for a minute [sic], though he might
be familiar with the -books, and be able"
to examine them without the clerk's
aid, to have the custody of the books
and papers of his office. * * * It is a
perversion of the right of inspection,
evidently intended to provide for exam-:
inations from time to time, as the ordi-
nary occasions and business of men may
require, to-make a business of it. The
law might well, in view of the ordinary
wants of the people, permit an inspec-
tion of the books, when no aid is re-
quired from the clerk, without a fee. It
is but a slight hindrance to him in his-
duties to keep his eye on the few citi-
zens who visit his office for such pur-
poses, and if he has only to stand by as,
a sentinel to prevent fraud or spoliation,
for a minute or two, it is but a small
matter, and may well be without a fee.
But the law never contemplated that
any person would make a business of'
it-spend days and weeks in the office
engaged in an occupation which, in our-
judgment, cannot lawfully be carried on
except under the immediate observation
of the clerk. Fees are given for eack
inspection, each abstract. The law has
in view the inspection of one chain of'
title-the status of one man-and fixes
a fee for that :" 51 Ga. 395,396.
When Beaz v. People was cited to.
the Wisconsin Court, in Hansoz v.
Eichstaedt, a distinction was suggested
by CASSODAY, J. (69 Wis. 541-2), based
upon the fee bill of the several clerks
and recorders (Gen. Stat. Colorado, p.
268, SEC. 584); hence, the abstracting
of the entire records, if permitted
would compel the recorder "to aid
in building up a rival establishment,
which would necessarily reduce the
emoluments of his office, and without
any statute, in terms, requiring him to
do so:" Id. 69 Wis. 542.
JOHN B. UHLE.
